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Expungement, Defamation, and False Light: 
Is What Happened Before What Really Happened or 
is There a Chance for a Second Act in America? 
  
Doris Del Tosto Brogan* 
The book club’s leader ask[ed] what Fitzgerald meant when he said 
there are no second acts in American lives. “He [is] saying that the past 
is always with us,” replies D’Angelo Barksdale, a middle manager in a 
drug-dealing empire . . . “You can say you somebody new. You can give 
yourself a whole new story. But what came first is who you really are, 
and what happened before is what really happened.”1 
 
“The past is whatever the records and the memories agree 
upon . . . [T]he past is whatever the Party chooses to make it. It also 
follows that though the past is alterable, it never has been altered in any 
specific instance. For when it has been re-created in whatever shape is 
needed at the moment, then this new version is the past, and no different 
past can ever have existed . . . In Newspeak it is called [D]oublethink.”2 
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Law School for its support of scholarly endeavors, and especially for a generous summer grant. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Once an individual who was convicted of a crime has served her 
sentence and satisfied any post-release conditions imposed, she has, as 
the saying goes, paid her debt to society and should be able to get on with 
her life. But easy access to criminal records by employers, media outlets, 
and even nosy neighbors can undermine the individual’s ability to re-
enter productive society. Responding to arguments that the albatross of a 
criminal record is among the most burdensome of the collateral 
consequences that follow a criminal charge or conviction, and contributes 
significantly to recidivism,3 most states have enacted statutory 
 
3. See, e.g., Anna Kessler, Comment, Excavating Expungement Law: A Comprehensive 
Approach, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 403, 405–06 (2015) (“The American criminal justice system often 
turns ‘even a minor offense into a life sentence by permanently keeping [ex-offenders] out of a 
job.’”); Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as 
Collateral Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
INTER ALIA 11, 11–12 (Nov. 7, 2016), http://ylpr.yale.edu/inter/alia/effectiveness-certificates-
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expungement or erasure statutes.4 But “[i]t’s far easier to get a criminal 
record than to eradicate one.”5 So even if the court seals a record, or 
orders it destroyed or erased,6 the footprints of that record will remain 
spread all over the web, just a click away. Indeed, its shadow may even 
remain in the official court records ordered to be expunged.7 And, in this 
data-driven, information-addicted era, what was once a public record 
available only through government sources now will be captured and 
made easily accessible in any number of venues not subject to 
expungement laws.8 What happens, then, when a news outlet—or even a 
 
relief-collateral-consequences-relief-mechanisms-experimental (citing statistics indicating that 
between 70 and 100 million Americans have a criminal record and detailing 44,500 collateral 
consequences of criminal convictions such as denial of public housing and disenfranchisement); 
see also Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 441–42 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (order granting a 
federal certificate of rehabilitation and noting how difficult it is for prospective employers to give 
the appropriate weight to an applicant’s past criminal record). 
4. See 50-State Guide to Expungement and Sealing Laws, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 13, 2016), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2016/01/13/expungement-and-
sealing-laws/ [hereinafter “50 State Guide to Expungement Laws”] (providing a comprehensive list 
of judicial expungement, sealing and set-aside laws in all fifty states); see also Chris Skall, Journey 
Out of Neverland: Cori Reform, Commonwealth v. Peter Pon, and Massachusetts’s Emergence as 
a National Exemplar for Criminal Record Sealing, 57 B.C. L. REV. 337, 341 (2016) (noting that 
“[m]ost states have statutory provisions authorizing courts to seal or expunge records,” but that 
states have enacted such provisions “in a disparate and non-uniform fashion”). As noted below, 
these statutes provide a variety of remedies and go by a variety of titles. For the purposes of this 
Article I will use the terms “expungement” and “expunge” throughout to encompass the range of 
remedies, except where it is necessary to make a distinction. 
5. Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 
321, 341 (2015) (quoting Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Fighting to Forget: Long After 
Arrests, Criminal Records Live On, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 25, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/fighting-to-forget-long-after-arrests-records-live-on-1419564612) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In the Internet age, damage to employment opportunity is not limited to criminal 
records. See The Internet Never Forgets, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug. 18, 2008), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-internet-never-forgets/ (recounting an instance 
when a job applicant sent a video of himself to a prospective employer that was later posted online 
and has diminished his employment prospects). 
6. Expungement statutes provide a range of remedies that themselves typically do much less 
than actually delete an individual’s criminal record. See 50 State Guide to Expungement Laws, 
supra note 4 (noting that most states’ laws “reach only minor offenses or non-conviction records” 
and that there is no federal expungement statute for federal convictions); see also infra notes 73–
106 and accompanying text (exemplifying the nature of expungement statutes). 
7. For a discussion of what various states’ expungement statutes require regarding records, see 
infra notes 73–106 and accompanying text (illustrating different expungement statutes that exist). 
8. See Laura K. McKenzie, Note, The Right to Domain Silent: Rebalancing Tort Incentives to 
Keep Pace with Information Availability for Criminal Suspects and Arrestees, 69 VAND. L. REV. 
875, 876–79 (2016) (noting that an individual’s options for removing an online story about an arrest 
or criminal investigation “range from inadequate to nonexistent”); see also Logan Danielle Wayne, 
Comment, The Data-Broker Threat: Proposing Federal Legislation to Protect Post-Expungement 
Privacy, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 253, 258–60 (2012) (discussing the prevalence of data 
brokers that collect criminal conviction records and are often not required to update their records 
to reflect a later record expungement). 
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private person—communicates an expunged criminal record? Does the 
individual have a cause of action against the speaker for that 
communication? Is it actually or “constructively”9 false in a way that 
might support a cause of action for defamation or under the false light 
tort? 
This Article will describe the problems faced by individuals who are 
harmed by the publication of criminal records that have been expunged, 
and explore possible remedies available. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, the questions I address 
can only be fully understood against the background of the crushing 
mass-criminalization problem and the devastating impact of the collateral 
consequences that flow from even a minor criminal record. As many 
others have reported, a staggering number of individuals whose lives 
have been derailed by criminal records have committed only minor, non-
violent crimes, often swept up in the vortex of the broken-windows 
approach to policing.10 In a 2015 article, Jenny Roberts noted that over 
the past four decades, approximately “one in three people in the United 
States has some type of criminal record[,] . . . and the FBI adds between 
10,000 and 12,000 new names to its database each day.”11 At the time 
she researched her article, Roberts reported that the FBI had 77.7 million 
individuals in its database.12 The majority of these records are for minor 
crimes. Roberts explains: 
People are arrested . . . for things like littering, disorderly conduct, 
possession of paraphernalia, driving with a license that has been 
suspended for failure to pay parking tickets, trespassing, turnstile 
jumping, or being drunk and causing people to stop and become 
annoyed or harassed. Many others have criminal records for minor drug 
possession.13 
 
9. Black’s Law Dictionary defines constructive as: 
That which is established by the mind of the law in its act of construing facts, conduct, 
circumstances, or instruments, that which has not the character assigned to it in its own 
essential nature, but acquires such character in consequence of the way in which it is 
regarded by a rule or policy of law[.] 
Constructive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) (citing Middleton v. Parke, 3 App. D.C. 
149, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1894)). 
10. Mass criminalization describes a different, even more pervasive problem than the more 
well-known issue of mass incarceration. See Joel Rogers, Foreword: Federalism Bound, 10 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 294 (2016) (noting that “[b]etween a quarter and a third of adult Americans 
have [criminal] records now, and each day the FBI adds another ten thousand new names to its 
arrests database, which already contains records on eighty million individuals”); see also Roberts, 
supra note 5, at 338 (citing statistics showing that 75 percent of all criminal court cases are 
misdemeanor “quality of life” offenses). 
11. Roberts, supra note 5, at 325–26. 
12. Roberts, supra note 5, at 326. 
13. Id. at 338; see also Laura Cohen, When the Law is Guilty: Confronting the Mass 
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Most troubling, the impact of mass criminalization falls most heavily 
on minority populations.14 A comprehensive analysis of solutions to the 
phenomenon of mass criminalization lies beyond the scope of this Article 
and the competence of this author. Others have taken on the issue with 
intelligence and thoughtful suggestions for reform.15 But it is clear that 
the pendulum of criminal justice reform swings back and forth.16 We 
appear to be in an era of increasing faith in mass criminalization and of 
reliance on the prison-industrial complex as offering solutions to 
perceived problems, especially in our cities, so vividly chronicled in Ava 
DuVernay’s stunning film 13th.17 The real solution to the problems I 
attempt to address here must lie in comprehensive criminal justice 
reform. In the absence of that, I will analyze whether other remedies 
might exist to provide some relief. 
First, I will briefly summarize representative expungement statutes 
which purport to erase the criminal record post facto. I conclude that even 
the most robust expungement protocols do not protect individuals 
because it is simply impossible to erase the record of an arrest, charge, or 
conviction from all the places it might appear, especially in this data-
driven information age. Indeed, sometimes expungement does more harm 
than good by deluding the expungee into relying on the fact that the 
record has been erased effectively, only to have it discovered by a 
prospective employer, lender, or other third party who then concludes the 
expungee is both an ex-con and a liar. 
I then analyze whether it is possible to prevent access to criminal 
records or control publication of such information in the first instance, 
 
Incarceration Crisis in the United States, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 841, 843 (2014) (citing statistics 
regarding incarceration for minor, non-violent offenses). 
14. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (The New Press 2010) (asserting that the United States imprisons racial 
and ethnic minorities at a rate far greater than any other country); see also Congressman John 
Conyers, Jr., The Incarceration Explosion, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 377, 383 (2013) (“The mass 
incarceration of African Americans . . . serves as a system of racial control similar to Jim Crow-era 
laws”) (internal citation omitted); Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 967–68 (2013) (“From encounters with law enforcement 
officers on our nation’s streets, roads and highways, to arrest, to charging decisions (including 
youth charged as adults) to sentencing and to incarceration, poor African-Americans and Latinos 
are disproportionately injected into the criminal justice system and remain stuck in it.”); 13TH 
(Kandoo Films 2016). 
15. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 14; Conyers, supra note 14, at 383; 13TH, supra note 14; 
Roberts, supra note 5, at 338; see also Cohen, supra note 13, at 843 (citing statistics regarding 
incarceration for minor, non-violent offenses). 
16. See Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and 
the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 765–79 (2011) 
(detailing the uneven history of the restoration of rights and reputation after conviction in America). 
17. 13TH, supra note 14. 
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concluding that this is impossible because of important and appropriate 
constitutional guarantees protecting the right to access and the right to 
publish information concerning matters of public interest.18 
If it is not possible to prevent access to and publication of criminal 
records, can tort causes of action at least provide some remedy, and 
perhaps caution restraint on those who would publish criminal records? 
To answer this question, I examine potential tort claims, specifically, 
defamation and false light. I conclude that tort law offers no real remedy. 
In the context of a privacy claim, protection of the right to access and to 
publish publicly available records foreclose a privacy action. In the 
context of defamation and false light, such claims fail because the 
claimant cannot prove the essential element—falsity—when the 
information published is in fact true. In this regard, I discuss whether 
claimants might invoke a notion of constructive falsity—that is, relying 
on a fiction that would allow the process of expungement to miraculously 
transform what was once in fact true (arrest, charge, conviction) to 
“constructively false.” Again, the answer must be no. Important 
constitutional limitations on imposing sanctions, even in the form of 
damages, for publication of truthful speech, especially about a matter of 
public interest, foreclose such claims. The Supreme Court’s robust 
protection of speech laid out in New York Times v. Sullivan19 indicates 
clearly that the Court would not tolerate such a fiction. And this is as it 
should be. 
Next I consider whether, in the context especially of online 
publications (where the potential for harm is greatest because of the long 
shelf-life and ready accessibility of such publications), statutory 
provisions might require publishers to correct the record or to publish 
addendums to reports of criminal records following expungement. Again, 
Supreme Court precedent clearly indicates that such forced speech would 
be found to violate the First Amendment.20 
 
18. As noted below, criminal proceedings and criminal conduct have been found to be matters 
of public interest for First Amendment purposes. See infra notes 124–159 and accompanying text 
(citing to numerous cases that illustrate this point). 
19. N.Y. Times Co. v. L. B. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding that a public official 
can recover for defamation only by proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant 
acted with reckless disregard (actual malice) for the truth or falsity of the communication). The 
Court noted that it viewed the case “against the background of a profound national commitment to 
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it 
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials.” Id. at 270 (internal citations omitted). 
20. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 262 (1974) (holding that a state law 
requiring a newspaper to provide print space to political candidates violated the First Amendment); 
see also infra notes 272–281 and accompanying text (describing Tornillo in more detail). 
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Against this background, I offer a modest suggestion: Publishers, 
specifically online publishers, should voluntarily adopt policies under 
which, in certain well-defined circumstances, they would publish 
addendums to publications of criminal records, indicating that the record 
has been officially expunged, and perhaps the circumstances justifying 
the expungement. 
I.  THREE STORIES 
“Reality continues to ruin my life.”21 
For over a century, courts have wrestled with how to protect the idea 
of a second act for individuals involved in the criminal justice system 
while also protecting the law’s essential commitment to the marketplace 
of ideas informed by free and robust expression of truthful information. 
The early cases drew on Warren and Brandeis’s groundbreaking article, 
“The Right to Privacy,” and Dean Prosser’s synthesis of four tort causes 
of action sounding in privacy, specifically invoking the “disclosure of 
private facts” cause of action. That approach did not work well. More 
recently, individuals have turned to false light and defamation for 
remedies. Is there a cause of action that can provide relief in these cases? 
Is there even a real harm in need of a remedy, or are consequences—
intended and unintended, direct and indirect—simply a reality that those 
with a criminal record try futilely to control? 
To set the stage for our discussion, I begin with three stories of 
individuals whose lives were ruined by publication of details of their 
criminal pasts. 
Gabrielle Darley Melvin: Tried and Acquitted—In 1918, Gabrielle 
Darley shot Leonard Topp, her lover and pimp, after he abandoned her 
for another woman. She was arrested and tried for murder. In her defense, 
“she told a pitiful story of love, abandonment, and betrayal.”22 She was 
acquitted.23 In 1919, she married Bernard Melvin and, at least as she told 
it, turned away from her past to live an “exemplary, virtuous, honorable, 
and righteous life” as Mrs. Melvin, caring for the family home and taking 
her place in “respectable society” among many friends who knew nothing 
of her previous life.24 In 1925, actress-turned-producer Dorothy 
 
21. BILL WATTERSON, THE COMPLETE CALVIN AND HOBBES (Andrews McMeel Publishing 
2005). 
22. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 216 (Stanford University Press 2007) 
[hereinafter “LIFE’S DARK SECRETS”]. 
23. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931). 
24. Id. Mrs. Melvin’s new life may not have been as respectable as she described it. There is 
evidence she continued working as a prostitute and madam after marrying Mr. Melvin. See LIFE’S 
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Davenport, or as she was known, Mrs. Wallace Reid,25 produced a movie 
called The Red Kimono, which was part of a series of exposé films 
focusing on serious social issues of the day.26 The film told Gabriella 
Darley Melvin’s story as a cautionary, socially conscious tale. It cast 
Darley as an innocent young woman exploited by her lover—a smooth 
talker who lured Darley from her abusive home with promises of love 
and a better life. But instead, he forced her into a life of prostitution, only 
to later abandon her in order to marry another woman, using Darley’s 
money to buy the ring. A distraught Darley tracked Topp down in 
California and shot him dead, leading to her trial for murder. Reid 
described the film as being based on a true story, and used the now Mrs. 
Melvin’s actual birth name, Gabriella Darley. Melvin reported that 
because of the film, her friends and family learned of her difficult past, 
were scandalized, and shunned her. Melvin’s new life as an upstanding 
citizen was ruined. 
Marvin Briscoe: Convicted and Rehabilitated—In 1956, Marvin 
Briscoe and at least one accomplice “hijacked a truck in Danville, 
Kentucky.”27 After some time on the run, and a gun battle with police, 
Briscoe surrendered, eventually pleaded guilty to several crimes, and was 
sentenced to prison.28 According to Briscoe, shortly after these events he 
“abandoned his life of shame and became entirely rehabilitated 
and . . . lived an exemplary, virtuous and honorable life . . . assum[ing] a 
place in respectable society,” marrying, starting a family, and making 
new friends, all of whom were “[un]aware of this incident [from] his 
earlier life.”29 Just over a decade after the hijacking, Briscoe’s epiphany, 
and his rehabilitation, Reader’s Digest published a five-page article 
 
DARK SECRETS, supra note 22, at 218 (citing to how difficult it already was for Mrs. Melvin to 
start all over again). 
25. Ms. Davenport married her co-star, swashbuckling silent film lead Wallace Reid. It was 
Reid’s death from morphine addiction that is believed to have inspired Dorothy Davenport to 
launch the film series, which included an expose on the horrors of addiction. See John Sinnott, The 
Red Kimona, DVD TALK (May 31, 2008), http://www.dvdtalk.com/reviews/33379/red-kimona-
the/ (highlighting Ms. Davenport’s film career). 
26. Id. 
27. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 36 (Cal. 1971), overruled by Gates v. 
Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004). The truck, which may have looked like it 
was transporting valuable merchandise, was actually carrying four bowling pin spotters from 
Yonkers, New York, worth little on any resale market available to Briscoe. Id. 
28. JAMES HIGDON, THE CORNBREAD MAFIA 64–67 (Lyons Press 2013). 
29. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 36. From the opinion in Briscoe, one might conclude that the hijacking 
was something of an unusual foray into crime by Briscoe—a bumbling misadventure. However, 
Higdon describes Briscoe as a “young tough” who, along with his accomplice in the hijacking, 
conducted a “reign of terror,” which included arson, beatings, and shootings. See HIGDON, supra 
note 28, at 64 (describing this “reign of terror”). 
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entitled “The Big Business of Hijacking” that focused on truck hijacking 
as a crime phenomenon. The photo introducing the article included a 
caption exclaiming: “Today’s highwaymen are looting trucks at a rate of 
more than $100 million a year.”30 The article chronicled numerous 
hijackings, including Briscoe’s, which it described as follows: “Typical 
of many beginners, Marvin Briscoe and [another man] stole a ‘valuable-
looking’ truck in Danville, Ky., and then fought a gun battle with the local 
police. . . . ”31 The article did not specify the year that any of the crimes 
it described took place (specifically, it did not mention that Briscoe’s 
crime occurred in 1956), but did mention dates from 1965 through 
publication of the article in 1968 in the text. Although he was referred to 
only in that one sentence, after the article was published Briscoe reported 
that his young daughter, who had not known about his past, learned of 
her father’s criminal history, and that friends and family now shunned 
him because of what was revealed in the article. 
Lorraine Martin: Arrested but not Prosecuted—Lorraine Martin and 
her two sons were arrested on August 20, 2010. Police searched their 
home on suspicion that the family was involved in a drug ring. The search 
of their home yielded “marijuana, scales, plastic bags, and drug 
paraphernalia.”32 Local news sources, including Hearst Publishing 
outlets, covered the arrest. On August 26, 2010, one of the Hearst 
company’s online newspapers reported that the police “arrested [Martin] 
and charged [her] with numerous drug violations . . . after police received 
information that a pair of brothers were [sic] selling marijuana in town.”33 
On August 27, 2010, a Hearst broadcast outlet published an online article 
reporting that Martin was “arrested on Aug. 20 after police say they 
confiscated 12 grams of marijuana, scales and traces of cocaine from 
[her] house.”34 The articles were truthful and remained online.35 Just over 
a year later, the state decided not to prosecute Martin and entered a nolle 
prosequi,36 an action that essentially suspends the proceeding without 
any final determination, but that permits the possibility of reinstating the 
charges within the applicable statute of limitations.37 In Martin’s case, 
 
30. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 36. 
31. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40 (2015). 
33. Id. at 549. 
34. Id. 
35. See id. (“Martin concedes that [the] reports were accurate at the time they were published.”). 
36. Id. 
37. See, e.g., Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 420 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cislo v. City of 
Shelton, 692 A.2d 1255, 1260 n.9 (Conn. 1997)) (“[Under Connecticut law,] [a] nolle prosequi is 
a ‘unilateral act by a prosecutor, which ends the pending proceedings without an acquittal and 
without placing the defendant in jeopardy.’”). 
 
10 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  49 
charges were not reinstated, and, pursuant to Connecticut’s Erasure Law, 
the record of her arrest was—well—erased. The Connecticut erasure 
statute specifies that when charges “ha[ve] been nolled . . . [and] at least 
thirteen months have elapsed since [the] nolle, all police and court records 
and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney . . . pertaining to such 
charge shall be erased. . . . ”38 Despite its name, erasure under the statute 
does not involve destruction of the record; rather, the record is sealed and 
kept from disclosure.39 The statute also specifies that the erasure shall 
occur by operation of law and that “the clerk or the person charged with 
the retention and control of such records shall not disclose to anyone their 
existence or any information pertaining to any charge so erased. . . . ”40 
That “seal” has power; once a record is erased and sealed, the subject of 
the record is deemed not to have been arrested ab initio.41 Further, this 
person “legally could state that he or she had not been arrested with 
respect to the relevant charges[,]”42 and the statute states that he or she 
could swear to that under oath.43 
Relying on the Erasure Statute, Martin asked the media outlets to 
remove the earlier stories reporting her arrest. They refused, and she sued, 
alleging claims for libel, false light, negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, and appropriation.44 
Consider the cases together: In Briscoe, an accurate report of an arrest 
and guilty plea gave rise to a privacy cause of action. In Melvin, an 
accurate report of life facts and an acquittal gave rise to a privacy cause 
of action. However, the outcomes of both these cases were later called 
into question by a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions beginning with 
Cox Broadcasting, which held that truthful reports of facts relating to 
criminal matters of public interest are protected by the First 
Amendment.45 Indeed, the California Supreme Court, responding to these 
 
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(c)(1) (2017). The statute also provides for erasure when an 
accused is found not guilty or the charges have been dismissed. Id. § 54-142a(a). 
39. See Skall, supra note 4, at 350 n.67 (“‘Erasure,’ as used in the [Connecticut] statute, does 
not refer to the physical destruction of records, but rather to the act of sealing the records and 
keeping them from public view.”). 
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(c)(1) (2017). 
41. See id. § 54-142a(e)(3). The statute provides that the subject may “swear under oath” as to 
the erasure. Id. 
42. Cislo v. City of Shelton, 692 A.2d 1255, 1261 (Conn. 1997). 
43. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(e)(3) (2017); see also Cislo, 692 A.2d at 1261 (noting the 
history of amendments to § 54-142a(c) since its enactment in 1963). 
44. See Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40 
(2015) (describing Martin’s argument that even though she was arrested, once erasure occurred, it 
became false to publish statements about her arrest). Martin also sued for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and invasion of privacy all based on the reports. See id.  
45. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 470 (1975) (holding that protection of freedom 
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holdings, overturned Briscoe explicitly in Gateway v. Discovery 
Communications,46 and many commentators question the continued 
viability of the public disclosure tort, particularly in cases involving 
criminal proceedings or other matters falling into the broad sweep of 
matters of public interest.47 In Martin, the plaintiff, no doubt informed by 
the Cox line of cases, hinged her claims on falsity. Although not pleaded 
as such, Martin must have contemplated constructive falsity, created by 
the Erasure Statute’s retroactive rewriting and sealing of the record of 
Martin’s actual arrest, and effective nullification of that arrest. 
Nonetheless, Martin’s case was dismissed.48 The Second Circuit found 
that the information in the articles was in fact true, and that they 
accurately reported the facts, despite the operation of the Erasure Statute, 
and so “her various publication-related tort claims necessarily fail[ed].”49 
Was the California court right in its first take on Briscoe and Melvin? 
As the court in Melvin stated, and the court in Briscoe repeated, “[o]ne of 
the major objectives of society . . . and of the administration of our penal 
system, is the rehabilitation of the fallen and the reformation of the 
criminal.”50 In Briscoe, the court did consider the public interest 
argument; it anticipated and responded to what the U.S. Supreme Court 
would later say, recognizing that “[t]he public has a strong interest in 
enforcing the law, and this interest is served by accumulating and 
disseminating data cataloguing the reasons men commit crimes, the 
methods they use, and the ways in which they are apprehended.”51 But in 
 
of press provided by First Amendment bars state from sanctioning truthful publication of rape 
victim’s name when information is legally obtained); see also Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 
U.S. 97, 97 (1979) (holding statute prohibiting publication of truthful, lawfully obtained 
information identifying alleged juvenile offender violated First Amendment); Landmark 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 829 (1978) (finding criminal punishment of news media 
for publishing truthful, lawfully obtained information regarding confidential proceedings of 
Judicial Inquiry violated First Amendment); Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court in & for Okla. Cty., 
430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977) (holding truthful publication of name of minor involved in criminal 
proceeding, legally obtained, was protected by First Amendment). For a fuller discussion of the 
Cox line of cases, see infra notes 141–156 and accompanying text (illustrating that the U.S. 
Supreme Court found this issue pressing). 
46. Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 559 (Cal. 2004). 
47. See, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for A Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 337 (1983) (stating common law private-facts 
tort has failed to become usable and effective means of redress for plaintiffs and is “both 
constitutionally and practically untenable”). 
48. Martin, 777 F.3d at 546. 
49. Id. at 552. 
50. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 41 (Cal. 1971) (quoting Melvin v. Reid, 297 
P. 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931), overruled by Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 
(Cal. 2004)). 
51. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 40. 
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balancing the competing interests, the state court analyzed whether 
disclosing the detail of the individual’s name and connecting his criminal 
past with his rehabilitated present was important.52 It concluded it was 
not, and that interest in this particular detail of truthful information 
amounted to mere curiosity which did not outweigh society’s interest in 
rehabilitation.53 “[S]ociety should permit him to continue in the path of 
rectitude rather than throw him back into a life of shame or crime.”54 
In Briscoe and Melvin, the aggrieved individuals sought their remedies 
in privacy actions, arguing that the passage of time and their rehabilitation 
transformed what may have been a matter of public interest into a private 
matter.55 Martin, on the other hand, argued that the operation of the 
Erasure Statute actually transformed the facts, or erased them.56 
Expungement or erasure statutes such as the one at issue in Martin foster 
the policy interests the courts in Briscoe and Melvin sought to protect. 
They are designed to minimize the collateral damage of arrest and 
conviction and to facilitate reentry into society, thus reducing the risk of 
recidivism.57 Should these policies trump the public’s interest in the 
details of crimes? The Connecticut legislature gave the statute at issue in 
Martin teeth, as noted above, by providing that Martin could deny her 
criminal record.58 If Martin could swear under oath that she was never 
arrested, how could a news outlet’s report that she was arrested be 
protected as truthful speech? Yet, how could it not, without descending 
into Orwellian Doublethink?59 In his thoughtful opinion in Martin, Judge 
Wesley drew on the Rubáiyát, observing: “The Moving Finger has 
 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 41. 
55. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931); Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 36. 
56. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40 (2015). 
57. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 327 (“Collateral consequences are the purportedly nonpunitive, 
noncriminal consequences that can flow automatically or as a matter of discretion from a criminal 
conviction. These consequences affect a person’s employment and housing prospects, parental 
rights, educational opportunities, freedom of movement, and just about every other aspect of daily 
life.”); see also Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Note, Chained to the Past: An Overview of Criminal 
Expungement Law in Minnesota–State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1332 (2005) 
(“A publicly available criminal record is devastating to an individual’s hope of re-integrating into 
society. . . . ”). 
58. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text (discussing Connecticut’s Erasure Law, 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a (2017)). 
59. ORWELL, supra note 2, at 213–14. As noted above, in Orwell’s 1984, the party could just 
rewrite history, and once rewritten, the old version disappeared—never was: “[T]hough the past is 
alterable, it never has been altered in any specific instance. For when it has been re-created in 
whatever shape is needed at the moment, then this new version is the past, and no different past can 
ever have existed.” ORWELL, supra note 2, at 213. 
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written and moved on.”60 The poet added that “nor thy [p]iety nor [w]it 
[s]hall lure it back to cancel half a [l]ine, [n]or all thy [t]ears wash out a 
[w]ord of it.”61 But an expungement or erasure statute can—or can it? 
This Article uses these cases, focusing primarily on the Martin case, 
as a backdrop for consideration of how to balance the interests of the 
individual and society in rehabilitation and policies that support a “second 
chapter” in people’s lives, with the competing interest in preserving free, 
informed, and robust debate, and the constitutional protections for 
truthful speech, addressing primarily whether a truthful report of an arrest 
or conviction, once expunged,62 should give rise to falsity-based claims 
sounding in defamation or false light. 
II.  EXPUNGEMENT: INTO THE MEMORY HOLE63 
“Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.”64 
Expungement as a concept gained footing as a result of mid-twentieth 
century criminal law reform movements that focused on rehabilitative 
justice and the notion of a redeemed former offender. Such reform began 
in the 1940s in specialized sentencing regimes designed for juveniles, 
both because they were more likely to be rehabilitated, and because it 
seemed unfair to burden the youthful offender with a record for a lifetime 
given what was understood even then about the realities of brain 
development in adolescents.65 Eventually, in what one commentator 
described as “the optimistic temper of the times,” the idea of wiping the 
slate clean, both to encourage and to reward real rehabilitation, was 
extended to adult offenders as well.66 Although the optimistic 
 
60. Martin, 777 F.3d at 552 n.7 (citing Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyam, stanza 71 (Edward 
Fitzgerald trans., 4th ed. 1879)). 
61. Id.  
62. See supra notes 49–91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various expungement 
options. Jurisdictions apply a variety of names and remedies to the processes available to cleanse a 
criminal record. For convenience, I will usually rely on expungement and expunge to capture the 
various models. 
63. [T]hey were nicknamed memory holes. When one knew that any document was due for 
destruction . . . it was an automatic action to lift the flap of the nearest memory hole and drop 
it in, whereupon it would be whirled away on a current of warm air . . . to the enormous 
furnaces which were hidden somewhere in the recesses of the building. 
ORWELL, supra note 2, at 37–38. 
64. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK 53 (1914). 
65. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten 
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1709–10 (2003) [hereinafter 
“Starting Over”] (describing the early idea that children’s “antisocial conduct was . . . temporary”); 
see also A. Rae Simpson, Young Adult Development Project, MIT WORK-LIFE CENTER, 
http://hrweb.mit.edu/worklife/youngadult/brain.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (“[T]he human 
brain does not reach full maturity until at least the mid-20s.”). 
66. Starting Over, supra note 65, at 1710–11. 
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rehabilitative tenor of the 1950s and 1960s soon gave way to a more 
retributive approach to criminal justice,67 most jurisdictions (except the 
federal government) have adopted some mechanism for sealing, 
expunging, or erasing records.68 
A.  State Expungement Laws 
What these provisions are called, and the exact details of how they 
function in terms of who may seek relief, how the individual seeks relief, 
and what precise relief is granted, differ widely from state to state.69 For 
our purposes, the nature of the relief granted is the most important issue. 
Quite appropriately, most jurisdictions provide different expungement 
relief depending on the nature of the circumstances and the characteristics 
of the individual. Consistent with the history of expungement 
jurisprudence, juvenile offenders are given more generous relief, as are 
individuals who are charged and acquitted or individuals who are charged 
or arrested, but who are not ultimately prosecuted. Those convicted of 
felonies are typically given the least in terms of expungement remedies. 
Misdemeanors generally fall in the middle.70 But again, our focus here is 
on the remedy itself and what it means, regardless of whether it is the 
right result given the seriousness of the crime, or the age or status of the 
offender. Therefore, I will begin by looking at representative statutory 
provisions and examining how expungement is implemented as the 
necessary background for understanding how expunged information 
remains available, and how subsequent reports of expunged information 
should be handled, but without focusing unnecessarily on the status of the 
 
67. Starting Over, supra note 65, at 1714–15. 
68. See Amy Shlosberg et al., Expungement and Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 353, 355–57 (2014) (explaining how forty-five states and Washington, D.C., have 
some process to expunge criminal records, while the federal government does not allow 
expungement for most offenses); see also 50 State Guide to Expungement Laws, supra note 4 
(comparing the methods that the states take in expunging a criminal record). 
69. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 323 (“There is no one definition of sealing or expungement. 
These terms have a variety of definitions under different state laws, which can range from actual 
destruction of a record to leaving the record open to the public but marking it ‘expunged.’”); see 
also David A. Weintraub, When Does “No” Mean “Yes”? With Expungements, of Course, 88 APR 
N.Y. ST. B.J. 47, 48–49 (2016) (surveying various states’ expungement statutes); 50 State Guide to 
Expungement Laws, supra note 4 (discussing how expungement “may involve destruction of 
records . . . limited restriction on public access . . . [or] no limit of public access at all—although 
some records may be sealed”). 
70. See 50 State Guide to Expungement Laws, supra note 4 (describing how most of the new 
state expungement laws cover minor offenses); see also 50-State Comparison Judicial 
Expungement, Sealing, Set-aside, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CENTER (last updated 
June 2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-2/restoration-of-rights/50-state-
comparisonjudicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside/ [hereinafter “50 State Guide Comparison 
Chart”] (comparing the various state expungement laws). 
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individual, the procedural posture of the charges, or the seriousness of the 
crime. Others have chronicled this.71 
Some jurisdictions actually destroy the records, and say so clearly. For 
example, the standard expungement order in Pennsylvania, which 
permits expungement under fairly limited circumstances, requires the 
“[Commonwealth to] expunge and destroy the official and unofficial 
arrest, expungement and other documents pertaining to the arrest or 
prosecution[.]”72 Alabama permits an individual to petition the court to 
order a juvenile record destroyed five years after the individual attains 
majority,73 and allows the court to “expunge nonconviction records of 
nonviolent felonies and misdemeanors, including [specifically] cases 
where the charges were dismissed[,]” requiring all agencies with these 
records to eliminate and remove them within thirty days.74 South 
Carolina’s statute provides (with some minor exceptions) that when a 
charge has been dismissed or the accused found not guilty, “all records 
must be destroyed and ‘no evidence of the record . . . [may] be retained 
by any municipal, county, or State law enforcement agency.’” 75 Illinois 
uses the word expunged and then explicitly defines the term to mean that 
records held by criminal agencies must be destroyed and any listing or 
index including the individual’s name must also be destroyed.76 The 
Illinois legislature deals more gingerly with court records providing that 
when a record is expunged, the court records must be impounded, and 
under certain circumstances, the name of the individual “obliterated on 
the official index,” and court personnel must respond to inquiries about 
these records “as it does in response to inquiries when no records ever 
 
71. To be sure, the trend in expungement laws is to give the greatest relief to juvenile offenders 
who have subsequent clean records, and to those wrongfully charged. See, e.g., 50 State Guide 
Comparison Chart, supra note 70 (showing various state expungement laws for juvenile offenders); 
see also Roberts, supra note 5 (discussing the scope of state expungement laws); see generally 
Wallace Wade, Who’s Lying Now?: How the Public Dissemination of Incomplete, Thus Half-
Truthful, Criminal Record Information Regarding a Statutorily Rehabilitated Petty Offender is an 
Unjust Penalty and Why Laws Regarding Expungement of and Restrictions on Dissemination of 
Criminal Records Information in California Must Be Reformed, 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2010) 
(noting the ineffectiveness of California’s statutes on expunging juveniles’ records). 
72. Doe v. Zappala, 987 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009). 
73. See ALA. CODE §§ 12-15-136, 12-15-137 (2016). The court enters a destruction order, 
which requires that “all references including arrest, complaints, referrals, petitions, reports, and 
orders shall be removed from all department or agency official and institutional files and 
destroyed.” Id. § 12-15-137(b). 
74. 50 State Guide Comparison Chart, supra note 70 (citing ALA. CODE §§ 15-27-1-2, 41-9-
625 (2016)). “Eliminate and remove” would seem to contemplate destruction of the records. 
75. 50 State Guide Comparison Chart, supra note 70 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-1-40 (2016)). 
76. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 2630/5.2(a)(1)(E) (2017) (“‘Expunge’ means to physically destroy 
the records or return them to the petitioner and to obliterate the petitioner’s name from any official 
index or public record, or both.”). 
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existed.”77 
While some jurisdictions in some instances call for the actual 
destruction or obliteration of records that have been expunged, more 
frequently the provisions call for sealing or limiting access to the records. 
Exactly what this means again differs from state to state. For example, 
the Louisiana code provides: “‘Expunge a record’ means to remove a 
record of arrest or conviction, photographs, fingerprints, disposition, or 
any other information of any kind from public access.”78 But the statute 
is clear that remove does not mean destroy: “‘Expunge a record’ does not 
mean destruction of the record.”79 
Indiana provides that for certain misdemeanors, when the court grants 
expungement, it must order the involved law enforcement agencies to 
“prohibit the release of the person’s records or information in the person’s 
records to anyone without a court order, other than a law enforcement 
officer acting in the course of the officer’s official duty[,]” and must 
“[o]rder the central repository for criminal history information 
maintained by the state police department to seal the person’s expunged 
conviction records.”80 Records sealed under this subdivision may be 
disclosed only to limited officials (including prosecutors, the FBI, 
defense attorneys, mortgage investigators, and interestingly, the Supreme 
Court and bar examiners in the context of bar admissions).81 Further, in 
a quite remarkable provision, the statute requires that when the name of 
an individual granted expungement is included in an opinion or 
memorandum decision, the court must take the following steps: 
(1) redact the opinion or memorandum decision as it appears on the 
computer gateway administered by the office of technology so it 
does not include the petitioner’s name (in the same manner that 
opinions involving juveniles are redacted); and 
(2) provide a redacted copy of the opinion to any publisher or 
organization to whom the opinion or memorandum decision is 
 
77. Id. § 2630/5.2(d)(9)(A)(iii). 
78. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 972(1) (2017). 
79. Id. 
80. IND. CODE § 35-38-9-6(a)(1)–(2) (2016). 
81. Id. § 35-38-9-6(a)(2). The issue of how bar applicants and bar examiners should respond 
under various expungement protocols, especially those that specify the individual may deny under 
oath the expunged record, raises serious concerns for applicants, law schools, and bar officials. See, 
e.g., Mitchell M. Simon, Limiting the Use of Expunged Offenses in Bar and Law School Admission 
Processes: A Case for Not Creating Unnecessary Problems, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 79 (2014) (discussing the impact of expunged offenses in the law school and bar admission 
processes); see generally Lydia Johnson, The Illusion of a Second Chance: Expunctions Versus the 
Law School and State Bar Application Processes, 9 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 183 (2013) (discussing 
the problems with the disclosure questions on law school applications). 
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provided after the date of the order of expungement.82 
The Indiana statute does specifically state that the court is not required 
to destroy these opinions, just redact the expunged individual’s name in 
its records. But the fact that the statute contemplates sending the redacted 
opinion to various “publishers” appears to contemplate that Lexis, 
Westlaw, et al., are expected to take some action. Would they? Must 
they?83 Indiana’s acknowledgement of the problem, and the legislature’s 
efforts to manage information after it has been disseminated, informs our 
discussion as yet another effort to rewrite the record. 
Maryland provides for expungement of some records and shielding of 
others. According to the Maryland statute, expungement requires the 
information to be removed from public inspection, which can be by either 
“obliteration” or “removal to a separate secure area to which persons who 
do not have legitimate reason for access are denied access.”84 Under 
“Disposition of Expunged Records,” the Maryland Court Rules specify 
that expunged court files “shall be removed from their usual and 
customary filing or storage location.”85 Files must be placed in a “manila 
envelope” that carries the docket number, as well as the Clerk’s 
Certificate of Expungement and Caution, which reads in relevant part: 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that this sealed envelope contains the case file 
relating [to the docket matter] . . . which records have been 
expunged . . . CAUTION: This envelope is not to be unsealed or the 
contents or any part thereof disclosed to any person except pursuant to 
a written Order of the Court, under penalty of a fine of up to $1,000, 
imprisonment for up to one year . . . and to dismissal from 
employment.86 
 
82. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-6(c) (2016). 
83. Online catalogues of court proceedings, coupled with the evolution of fast and efficient 
search engines that can locate this material using just a name, have created a nasty privacy problem 
for individuals who must expose often highly intimate, sometimes embarrassing details to a court 
for any variety of reasons (for example, actions for benefits or insurance coverage; family disputes; 
competency proceedings; etc.). A mess to be sure, but one that is beyond the scope of this Article 
and addressed by a good number of excellent scholarly articles. See, e.g., Amanda Conley et. al., 
Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court Records: A 
Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772 (2012) (addressing the problems that are created 
with easily accessible online court records); Symposium, Panel One: General Discussion on 
Privacy and Public Access to Court Files, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing the concern 
of disclosing private information with the increase of public accessibility to court files); Peter A. 
Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age of 
Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307 (2004) (arguing that the traditional balance of 
disclosure of judicial records and the need to limit disclosure is upset when judicial records are 
available online). 
84. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-101(e) (West 2016). 
85. MD. RULE 4-512. 
86. Id. 
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The Clerk is required to keep an alphabetical listing of expunged records, 
but that list is to be kept in a locked cabinet in a secure area with no public 
access.87 
On the other hand, shielding under the Maryland statute “means to 
render a court record and police record relating to a conviction 
inaccessible by members of the public.”88 A shielded record is accessible 
to specific individuals, including law enforcement and certain employers 
and licensing agencies that are required by law to do criminal background 
checks,89 but those individuals are prohibited from disclosing the 
shielded information to anyone other than those specifically identified by 
the statute.90 In addition, the Maryland statute specifies that Maryland’s 
criminal records search engine must not “in any way refer to the existence 
of specific records shielded” under the statute.91 Shielding applies to 
fewer (typically less serious) offenses and is easier to accomplish (it does 
not require a court hearing), while expungement applies to more serious 
matters and is harder to accomplish, but may provide stronger 
protections. 
Some states call for correction of the record, but not full 
expungement.92 For example, Arizona provides that a person 
“wrongfully arrested” may petition the court to require an entry on the 
person’s court and criminal records “that the person has been cleared.”93 
The statute also limits access: “The order shall further require that all law 
enforcement agencies and courts shall not release copies of or provide 
access to such records to any person except on order of the court.”94 
Ironically, this might actually undercut the effectiveness of the 
correction. 
Of particular interest for our purposes, several states permit the 
individual to deny that the record ever existed, and sometimes that the 
facts memorialized in it ever happened, through expungement or sealing. 
For example, as noted above, Connecticut’s Erasure Statute, which was 
in play in the Martin case, specifies that for matters where charges were 
never prosecuted, or where the accused was acquitted, erasure means that 
 
87. Id. 
88. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-301(e) (West 2016). 
89. Id. § 10-302(b)(2). 
90. Id. § 10-306(a). 
91. Id. § 10-304. 
92. See, e.g., State v. Mohajerin, 244 P.3d 107, 112 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing how 
Arizona’s statute allows for “notation of clearance” but does not authorize expungement or that law 
enforcement be denied access). 
93. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4051(A) (LexisNexis 2016). 
94. Id. § 13-4051(B). 
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the arrest is deemed never to have happened, and the individual “may so 
swear under oath.”95 Delaware provides that when a record of a juvenile 
offense is expunged, the offense “does not have to be disclosed as an 
arrest by the petitioner for any reason.”96 Similarly, Ohio provides that 
when a juvenile record is expunged, “the person who is the subject of the 
expunged records properly may, and the court shall, reply that no record 
exists with respect to the person upon any inquiry in the matter.”97 
Washington’s sentencing reform act provides for a broad range of 
offenders who satisfactorily complete their sentence to have them 
vacated.98 Once the sentence is vacated, the statute specifies that “[f]or 
all purposes . . . an offender whose conviction has been vacated may state 
that the offender has never been convicted of that crime.”99 
On a related note, many of these statutes also stipulate that the effect 
of an expungement is to decree by operation of law that the event did not 
occur. There is some slippage among jurisdictions regarding whether this 
applies to the legal proceeding (the arrest that did not result in a charge 
or a charge that did not result in a conviction), or the underlying facts (the 
real-world events that gave rise to the legal proceeding). Connecticut’s 
statute, for example, provides that when a charge is not prosecuted, it is 
expunged and that the person “shall be deemed to have never been 
arrested,”100 while Illinois (in a statute addressing juvenile convictions) 
specifies that once an expungement order is entered, “the 
offense . . . shall be treated as if it never occurred.”101 
B.  Expungement—A Cruel Illusion? 
As this sampling demonstrates, states offer a range of protections for 
expunged, sealed, or erased records. But, as noted above, even under the 
most protective regimes, the idea of expungement may be a cruel 
“illusion.”102 The record may remain in public repositories by virtue of 
 
95. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40 (2015); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a(e)(3) (West 2016). 
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1019(c) (2017). 
97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.358(F) (West 2017). 
98. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.640(2) (West 2016) (laying out the guidelines 
pertaining to what constitutes a satisfactory completion of a sentence). 
99. Id. § 9.94A.640(3). 
100. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a(e)(3) (West 2016). 
101. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-915(2.6)(i) (2016). 
102. See Wade, supra note 71, at 14–15 (explaining the differences between the legal and 
dictionary definitions of the term “expungement” as analogous to complete erasure, in contrast to 
California Penal Code § 1203’s express language stating that expungement does not relieve a party 
from the “obligation to disclose the conviction in response to any direct question contained in any 
questionnaire or application for public office”); see also Roberts, supra note 5, at 323 (explaining 
that expungement has varied definitions across jurisdictions); see also Wayne, supra note 8, at 257 
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delay or mistakes in effectuation of the order. Or, it may remain in some 
index or listing, or as the shadow of a record not completely erased 
everywhere. But even more important, the information subject to 
expungement, erasure, or sealing was once public, and so was likely 
disseminated. Therefore, it lurks in a variety of places not subject to the 
constraints of expungement laws, including media reports, the files of 
data brokers, scholarly journals, or as Wallace Wade observed, even in 
“a compulsive newspaper-clipper’s attic.”103 He illustrated his point by 
drawing on the medieval penance for gossipers: they were required to cut 
open a pillow and release the feathers from the rooftop, and then try to 
retrieve them—the effort to recapture all the feathers providing vivid 
imagery of the futility of recapturing the gossip, or in our case, the 
information, once let fly.104 
Often the expungement statutes attempt to address this issue. 
California’s statute makes an effort to recapture the information from 
some sources, requiring that consumer reporting agencies “no 
longer . . . [report]” criminal records if the individual was pardoned or an 
arrest resulted in nolle pros or an acquittal.105 Similarly, Connecticut’s 
statute requires data collection agencies that acquire and report criminal 
records to “permanently delete such erased records” and adds that these 
entities “shall not further disclose such erased records.”106 And, as noted 
above, Indiana requires that the court redact the names of individuals who 
have been granted expungement from various opinions and memoranda 
and to send these redacted opinions to publishers, presumably with the 
hope that they, too, will redact the names.107 Several federal statutes seek 
to achieve the same results, but only in narrow contexts, such as 
restricting the use of criminal records in credit reporting under the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act.108 How effective such requirements are in getting 
 
(discussing how expungements do not provide complete legal relief). 
103. See Wade, supra note 71, at 10, 30, 35 (noting that California Government Code § 6253.5 
allows disclosure of “whereabouts and victims of crime” for use in “scholarly, journalistic, political, 
or governmental purpose,” addressing the existence of issues regarding limits on private 
investigators’ and credit reporters’ use of such information, and noting that it is nearly impossible 
to completely erase all record of an arrest because evidence can remain in a variety of places outside 
the usual government databases such as a newspaper archive); see also Wayne, supra note 8, at 255 
(discussing how “expungement orders do not apply to non-government sources . . . at great cost to 
individuals with expunged records”). 
104. Wade, supra note 71, at 23 n.143. 
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786.18(a)(7) (West 2010). 
106. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142e(b) (West 2016). 
107. See MD. RULE 4-512 (outlining the process of recording expunged records in Maryland); 
see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-101(d)–(e) (West 2016) (which specifically defines 
the procedures described in MD. RULE 4-512). 
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (2012) (prohibiting credit reporting agencies’ use of arrest 
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actual compliance from the entities directed to delete the records remains 
to be seen. Further, such piecemeal efforts that address only certain 
sources leave many other places where the information will remain. To 
replace the “feathers” metaphor with one my father used for futile tasks, 
it is like sweeping the sun off the roof. 
C.  An Alternative: Forgive, Not Forget (And Say So Out Loud) 
Some who advocate for reform designed to lessen the collateral impact 
of conviction are moving away from the remedies of expungement and 
erasure and toward a system that acknowledges the past but admits (or 
exclaims) rehabilitation. As Judge Gleeson, who issued what has been 
identified as the first federal Certificate of Rehabilitation,109 observed, 
there are two general approaches to limiting the collateral consequences 
of convictions: (1) the “forgetting” model, in which a criminal record is 
deleted or expunged so that society may forget that the conviction ever 
happened; and (2) the “forgiveness” model, which acknowledges the 
conviction but uses a certificate of rehabilitation or a pardon to symbolize 
society’s forgiveness of the underlying offense conduct.110 
Judge Gleeson noted that momentum for the forgiveness argument has 
been increasing—and that argument convinced him to take the 
extraordinary step of issuing his self-styled Certificate of 
Rehabilitation.111 Relevant to our inquiry, Judge Gleeson explained that 
employers (and in the broader range of instances, those who do research 
on an individual’s history for whatever reason) do not have the time to 
 
records that precede issuance of credit reports by more than seven years). 
109. See Jesse Wegman, A Federal Judge’s New Model for Forgiveness, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/opinion/a-federal-judges-new-model-for-
forgiveness.html?_r=0 (explaining that Judge Gleeson designed a “federal certificate of 
rehabilitation” to obviate employment struggles faced by a woman who had served the entirety of 
her prison sentence for staging a false car accident to gain insurance benefits). While the federal 
system does not statutorily provide such relief, many states do. According to one media report, 
fourteen states have adopted some form of certificate of rehabilitation; see Eli Hager, Forgiving vs. 
Forgetting, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2015, 5:53PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/17/forgiving-vs-forgetting#.6wOWmwn5D 
(explaining Barack Obama’s 2003 Illinois State Senate bill that would provide those who had been 
arrested, or completed an incarceration or probation, a Certificate of Relief from Disabilities 
showing employers that they were rehabilitated and would no longer be judged for their crimes). 
110. Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 442 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing David J. Norman, 
Note, Stymied by the Stigma of a Criminal Conviction: Connecticut and the Struggle to Relieve 
Collateral Consequences, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 985, 1006 (2013)). 
111. See id. at 442, 445–46 (noting that there are both practical and philosophical reasons for 
the forgiveness model’s gained traction, and several states had already adopted similar remedies). 
Judge Gleeson patterned both his inquiry and his certificate on similar state remedies. Id. at 444–
45; see id. at 447 to view the actual certificate Judge Gleeson used. 
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scour the entire record of a former offender.112 Therefore, he undertook 
the analysis for them. He reviewed “each page of Doe’s trial transcript, 
presentence report, probation reports, deposition transcript, and other 
documents she and the government provided . . . or a holistic view of her 
character and competency today,” and concluded “that there [was] no 
relationship between Doe’s conviction and her fitness to be a nurse.”113 
As Judge Gleeson recognized, it is unlikely that those who rely upon or 
disseminate criminal records will have the resources (or the inclination) 
to undertake such a thorough analysis.114 Rather, the record typically will 
stand on its face and yield judgments about its meaning, usually 
damaging to the individual.115 
Exacerbating the problem, Frank Pasquale describes the impulse to 
instantly share information as an “accelerationist ethic” and notes the 
push to what is described in the information world as “frictionless 
sharing.”116 To illustrate, he quotes Gawker’s CEO as saying: 
Whatever information we have, whatever insight we have, whatever 
knowledge we have, our impulse is to share it as quickly as possible, 
and sometimes with as little thought as possible. . . . Before you can 
think about it too much, just put it out there, just share it out there.117 
Even more chilling, Pasquale describes extortion sites that capitalize 
on this “frictionless sharing” by trolling for mug shots and records, 
posting them, and then demanding money from the individuals depicted 
in exchange for taking down the pictures and records.118 
In light of this, the forgiveness argument is persuasive for a number of 
reasons, both principled and pragmatic.119 For our purposes, the 
pragmatic arguments are most significant, particularly considering the 
 
112. Id. at 441–42. 
113. Id. at 442. 
114. Id. at 441–42. 
115. See, e.g., Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1328 (2017) 
(explaining that past offenders are permanently reduced to “second-class status,” regardless of 
whether they have completed their required sentence); Anna Kessler, Comment, Excavating 
Expungement Law: A Comprehensive Approach, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 403, 405 (2015) (addressing 
the general public discrimination faced by those with criminal histories). 
116. Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515, 520 (2015). 
117. Id. at 519–20 (quoting Jonathan Mahler, Gawker’s Moment of Truth, N.Y. TIMES (June 
12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/business/media/gawker-nick-denton-moment-of-
truth.html). 
118. Id. at 536–37. 
119. See Love, supra note 16, at 759 (discussing the history of the restoration of rights and 
reputation after conviction in America). For a comprehensive argument to replace blame with 
forgiveness as the guiding principle of the criminal justice system, see Nichola Lacey & Hanna 
Pickard, To Blame or to Forgive? Reconciling Punishment and Forgiveness in Criminal Justice, 
35 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 665, 669–88 (2015) (advancing “responsibility without blame,” 
evolutionary, instrumental and ethical arguments for the forgiveness model). 
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futility of efforts to force “forgetting” in an age of modern technology 
and in light of First Amendment constraints. But is it possible to force 
real forgiveness? Even assuming a good-faith effort, knowing about a 
criminal record yet not having it influence one’s thinking and judgments 
sounds like Dostoevsky’s polar bear task: “Try . . . not to think of a polar 
bear, and you will see that the cursed thing will come to mind every 
minute.”120 Against this background, we will use Ms. Martin’s case as a 
hypothetical to explore possible solutions. 
III.  PREVENTING THE HARM BEFORE IT HAPPENS 
“If people are constantly falling off a cliff, you could place ambulances 
under the cliff, or build a fence at the top of the cliff.”121 
Given the difficulty of recapturing, correcting, or erasing criminal 
records, why not simply make them unavailable to the public, including 
the media in the first place, or at least prohibit publication of these 
records? The answer, of course, is that there are constitutional restraints 
on such strategies. Public access to judicial proceedings boasts a long 
history in Anglo-American jurisprudence.122 In the United States, this 
commitment to open access finds its inspiration in a Meiklejohnian 
philosophy of an informed electorate as essential to a functioning 
democracy.123 
A.  Restricting Access to Trials and Criminal Proceedings 
A line of Supreme Court cases, beginning with Richmond Newspapers 
v. Virginia, established a constitutional “presumption of openness” for 
criminal trials, later extending this presumption to other steps involved in 
 
120. Lea Winerman, Suppressing the “White Bears,” 42 MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 44, 44 
(Oct. 2011) http://www.apa.org/monitor/2011/10/unwanted-thoughts.aspx (citing FYODOR 
DOSTOEVSKY, WINTER NOTES ON SUMMER IMPRESSIONS 49 (David Patterson Trans. 1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that research by psychologist Daniel Wegner confirms 
Dostoevsky’s impressions)). 
121. John McDougall, Denis Burkitt, MD Opened McDougall’s Eyes to Diet and Disease, THE 
MCDOUGALL NEWSLETTER (Jan. 2013), 
https://www.drmcdougall.com/misc/2013nl/jan/burkitt.pdf (quoting Dr. Denis Burkitt). 
122. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556–57 (1980) 
(finding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments require allowance for press and public to attend 
criminal trials). 
123. See Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: 
Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 945–46 (2009) 
[hereinafter “Privacy and Access to Court Records”] (explaining Alexander Meiklejohn’s strong 
push in 1979 for a right of public admittance to trials as a First Amendment issue, the resolution of 
which was “intimately linked to the processes of republican self-government”); see also Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 575–76 (“[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the 
press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of 
information from which members of the public may draw.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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criminal proceedings.124 To be clear, this recognition of a presumption of 
access is not absolute, but rather a qualified right—a point the Court 
makes in each of the cases.125 Under modern application of the Richmond 
rule, the question of access is determined by applying a balancing 
analysis. The court must ask: “(1) whether the proceeding traditionally 
has been open to the public; and (2) whether public access would play a 
‘significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
question.’”126 If the answer to these two questions is yes, the court must 
meet what amounts to a strict scrutiny standard to close the proceeding. 
The court must make “specific, on the record findings . . . demonstrating 
that ‘closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest.’”127 Applying this standard, “the courts of appeals 
have found a First Amendment right of access to [a range of proceedings:] 
bail hearings, suppression hearings, guilty pleas, and sentencing 
hearings.”128 Thus, closing the proceeding will rarely meet constitutional 
muster. 
B.  Restricting Access to Court Records 
The logic of the open courtroom cases drives a similar outcome in 
cases involving access to records of criminal proceedings, although the 
Supreme Court has never squarely held that this right is constitutionally 
protected. Rather, in Nixon v. Warner Communications, the Court found 
a common law right to access court records, but not necessarily a 
constitutionally protected right to access.129 Nonetheless, the Court 
 
124. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 555 (considering fourth retrial of 
accused murderer); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Cty. of Riverside, 
478 U.S. 1, 3 (1986) (determining “whether petitioner ha[d] a First Amendment right of access to 
the transcript of a preliminary hearing growing out of a criminal prosecution”); see also Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 596 (1982) (examining whether 
state can exclude press from testimony of minor rape victims during trial). 
125. In a case decided before Richmond Newspapers, (never expressly overruled but limited in 
its application by subsequent cases) the Supreme Court found that closing a suppression hearing 
was appropriate under the particular circumstances of that case. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 
443 U.S. 368, 368–69 (1979). While Richmond Newspapers and the line of cases following it never 
overruled Gannett, it is worth noting that Gannett stated there is no constitutionally protected right 
of access, and reasoned that the constitutional protection of an open trial is personal to the 
defendant. See id. at 391–94. Richmond and its progeny, as noted in the text, found a 
constitutionally protected interest in public access to the criminal process in the First Amendment, 
a right that inures to the good of the public, not the individual. See Privacy and Access to Court 
Records, supra note 123, at 949–50. 
126. John Gerhart, Access to Court Proceedings and Records, 18 COMM. L. 11, 12 (Summer 
2000) (citing Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 10). 
127. Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 13–14; see also Privacy and Access to Court Records, 
supra note 123, at 948 (discussing the First Amendment right for public admittance at trial). 
128. Privacy and Access to Court Records, supra note 123, at 948. 
129. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608–09 (1978). Ultimately, the Court 
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noted: “It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right 
to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial 
records and documents.”130 In addition to the common law right, many 
circuit courts have recognized a qualified constitutionally protected right 
to access court documents—including plea agreements, sentencing 
motions, and even docketing systems—based on the Richmond 
Newspapers line of cases, decided after Nixon. These courts typically 
apply the two-part test and the strict scrutiny standard described above to 
challenges to access.131 
Courts and law enforcement have responded by making a vast trove of 
records available. “Today, almost all states have publicly available 
Internet databases of criminal records.”132 The federal courts’ Internet 
search engine provides access to federal court records and includes a 
search-by-name index.133 
One Supreme Court case that must be distinguished is U.S. Department 
of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.134 The case 
involved a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request by reporters 
seeking FBI criminal identification records, or rap sheets. The FBI denied 
the request, citing one of FOIA’s explicit exemptions, and the Court 
upheld that denial.135 The Court’s decision to deny access turned on its 
interpretation of FOIA’s privacy exception and, more important, on its 
determination that the material being sought did not constitute a public 
record of a criminal proceeding.136 The rap sheets being sought were a 
compilation of information submitted by a variety of sources, and as such 
were an agency record (a FOIA term of art) and not a record of “what the 
government was up to.”137 The Court reasoned that in the case of FOIA, 
 
denied access to twenty-two hours of President Nixon’s secret tapes that had been played at the 
criminal trial of the Watergate conspirators, relying on an explicit provision by Congress regarding 
how such historical presidential materials would be archived and disseminated. See id. at 610. 
130. Id. at 597. 
131. See Gerhart, supra note 126, at 14 (discussing the two-part test that asks whether this has 
been traditionally open to the public and then if public access would play a significant role); see 
also Privacy and Access to Court Records, supra note 123, at 948–49 (explaining that right of 
public admittance at trial equals republican self-government). 
132. Roberts, supra note 5, at 328. 
133. Privacy and Access to Court Records, supra note 123, at 922. 
134. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 749 
(1989) [hereinafter “Reporters Comm.”]. 
135. Id. at 753, 780. 
136. Id. at 765. 
137. See id. at 751–52 (explaining that rap sheets are compiled by the FBI from information 
submitted by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, and include vast amounts of 
information). The Court noted that the sheer volume of records, the amount of information 
contained for each individual, and the number of sources supplying records often results in records 
that contain incorrect or incomplete information, and sometimes information about persons other 
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the statute giveth, and the statute taketh away. Because the material did 
not constitute a record of a criminal proceeding per se, any right of access 
that existed was created by Congress through FOIA, and that right of 
access could be, and in fact was, limited by the nine congressionally 
created exemptions to FOIA’s right of access.138 The Court found that 
Exemption 7(C) protected these particular agency records.139 In reaching 
its conclusion that important privacy concerns were involved, the Court 
recognized a crucial principle in modern privacy jurisprudence: Large 
compilations of information that previously may have been publicly 
available, but that had been scattered about and difficult to access, create 
dangerous threats to personal privacy when accumulated in ways that 
make them readily accessible.140 
C.  Restricting Publication of Criminal Records and Proceedings 
Given the protection offered the right of access to criminal proceedings 
and to the records of those proceedings, might it be possible to restrict the 
publication or dissemination of sensitive information once obtained? 
Again, the answer is no—indeed, an even more resounding no. Efforts to 
prohibit or punish publication of legally obtained materials have been 
struck down consistently by the Supreme Court. As the Court reasoned 
in Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, “[w]e are reluctant to embark on a 
course that would make public records generally available to the media 
but forbid their publication.”141 While the Court insists that there is no 
absolute prohibition, a line of cases beginning with Cox has consistently 
refused to punish or prohibit accurate reporting of even the most sensitive 
and sensational information. 
In Cox, a reporter learned the name of a rape and murder victim who 
was a minor because the reporter was in the courtroom at the time the 
defendants pleaded guilty to the crime. The reporter then disclosed the 
victim’s name in his broadcast report about the proceedings. The victim’s 
 
than the person whose record it is supposed to be. Id. 
138. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). 
139. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756. Exemption 7(C) permits (but does not require) an 
agency to refuse to release law enforcement records whose production “‘could reasonably be 
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’” See id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(7)(C) (2012)). 
140. See id. at 763–71. As noted below, it is the ready access made possible by sophisticated 
search engines that compounds the problems created by the existence of criminal records. This 
concept informed the weight the Court gave Exemption 7(C)’s privacy interests. Further, the Court 
distinguished these compiled records noting “when the information is in the Government’s control 
as a compilation, rather than as a record of ‘what the Government is up to,’ the privacy interest 
protected by Exemption 7(C) is in fact at its apex while the FOIA-based public interest in disclosure 
is at its nadir.” Id. at 780. 
141. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975). 
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father sued for invasion of privacy, relying on both a Georgia statute that 
criminalized the publication of a rape victim’s name and Georgia’s 
common law privacy tort. The Supreme Court struck down the Georgia 
statute and held that allowing a privacy claim based on the accurate 
publication of judicial records such as this would violate the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.142 The Court explained: “The commission of 
crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising 
from the prosecutions . . . are without question events of legitimate 
concern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility of 
the press to report the operations of government.”143 By labeling judicial 
proceedings—and indeed all criminal proceedings—as matters of public 
interest, the Court set the bar high, cloaking these matters in the protective 
mantle of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny.144 
The Court next decided Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.145 In 
that case, the judge in a sensational murder trial entered an order 
prohibiting publication of any accounts of confessions, admissions, or 
facts “strongly implicative” of the accused.146 Because of the posture of 
Nebraska Press (a challenge to the order itself, not a defense to 
publication in violation of the order), the Court correctly characterized 
the issue as involving a prior restraint and imposing what amounted to an 
insurmountable hurdle.147 The Court observed that prior restraints come 
with a heavy presumption against validity and that the party seeking to 
uphold a prior restraint “carries a heavy burden.”148 Despite what the 
Court admitted to be the trial judge’s responsible efforts to ensure that the 
defendants receive a fair trial in a sensational atmosphere, the Court 
struck down the order as violating the Constitution.149 One year later, the 
Court decided Oklahoma Publishing v. District Court and struck down a 
pretrial order forbidding publication of an 11-year-old murder 
defendant’s name and photo—material that had been obtained during a 
 
142. Id. at 491, 496–97. 
143. Id. at 492. 
144. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (constitutionalizing the tort 
of defamation, which placed a high threshold on the element where the communication in question 
relates to either a public figure or a matter of public interest); see also infra notes 165–171 
(discussing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in detail). 
145. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 539 (1976). 
146. Id. at 570. 
147. See id. at 558 (holding that the respondent now has the burden of showing the justification 
for the imposition of the restraint). 
148. Id. 
149. See id. at 569–70 (resulting from both the specific facts of this case as well as the heavy 
burden that is now imposed on the respondent). 
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detention hearing in open court.150 
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, decided a year after 
Oklahoma Publishing, a newspaper publisher was criminally prosecuted 
for reporting that a judge was under investigation by a judicial inquiry 
panel, in violation of a Virginia statute that prohibited anyone, including 
those not involved in the proceeding, from divulging such information.151 
Again, the Court held that this proceeding was a matter of public 
interest.152 The Court found the Commonwealth’s argument that there 
were compelling reasons to keep this information confidential—
specifically, that “the public interest is not served by discussion of 
unfounded allegations of misconduct which defames honest judges and 
serves only to demean the administration of justice”—unconvincing, and 
held that criminal punishment of a third party who published legally 
obtained information violated the Constitution.153 
Smith v. Daily Mail is the next case in this line of what became virtually 
annual forays into this issue. In Smith, the Court considered whether a 
statute that prohibited publication of an underage criminal defendant’s 
name without permission from the court was constitutional. Again, the 
Court struck down the law. The Court began its analysis by stating that it 
did not matter whether it viewed the statute as a prior restraint or a 
sanction for publishing truthful information because either one “requires 
the highest form of state interest to sustain its validity.”154 Smith 
presented slightly different facts than the earlier cases in that the reporters 
in Smith did not obtain their information from court records or from being 
in the courtroom. Rather, they interviewed people at the crime scene, 
engaging in what the Court called “routine newspaper reporting 
 
150. See Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 308–11 (1977) (holding that under 
Oklahoma law, the judge could have closed the detention hearing and other court proceedings 
because they involved a juvenile (although as noted above, the court would have had to make a 
case for closure)). 
151. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 831–32 (1978). 
152. The Court stated as follows: 
Although it is assumed that judges will ignore the public clamor or media reports and 
editorials in reaching their decisions and by tradition will not respond to public 
commentary, the law gives “[j]udges as persons, or courts as institutions . . . no greater 
immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions.” The operations of the courts 
and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern. 
Id. at 838–39 (alteration in original) (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 289 (1941) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
153. Id. at 840–42. 
154. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101–02 (1979). This was surprising since the 
Court as recently as three years earlier had dubbed prior restraints “the most serious and the least 
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.” Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 
559 (1976). 
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techniques.”155 On one hand, this makes the Smith holding slightly less 
on point for the specific question at hand—the constitutionality of 
restraining or sanctioning publication of judicial proceedings. But it also 
vividly demonstrates the futility of attempts to control factual 
information—seal it in one place if you will, but the facts remain, and can 
be discovered. “The truth is out there.”156 
In The Florida Star v. B.J.F., the newspaper discovered and published 
a rape victim’s name because a member of the Sheriff’s department 
erroneously put a document reporting the crime that included the victim’s 
name in a bin in the pressroom.157 As in Smith, the information the 
reporter published was, by definition, not part of a public government 
record. While police reports left in the pressroom were routinely made 
available to the media, Florida law specified that “police reports which 
reveal the identity of the victim of a sexual offense are not among the 
matters of ‘public record’ which the public, by law, is entitled to 
inspect.”158 Nonetheless, consistent with Smith, the Court held that 
publishers of legally obtained information that related to a matter of 
public interest could not be punished or exposed to legal sanctions.159 But 
again, the Court explicitly refused to state a broad rule, noting: 
Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publication is 
automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of 
personal privacy within which the State may protect the individual from 
intrusion by the press, or even that a State may never punish publication 
of the name of a victim of a sexual offense.160 
But, in fact, in case after case, even in light of extraordinarily 
compelling circumstances, the Court has consistently struck the balance 
in favor of permitting access and protecting publication. It seems, 
therefore, that efforts to restrict access to information or to prohibit 
 
155. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103. 
156. The X-Files, “Opening Credits” (20th Century Fox Television 1993–2002); see, e.g., 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). The attorney-client privilege reflects this 
same lesson; it protects communication but cannot somehow cloak the facts as they exist in the real 
world. 
157. The Florida Starr v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526–27 (1989). 
158. Id. at 536. 
159. See id. at 540–41 (stemming from the need to preserve First Amendment Rights). The 
opinion explains as follows: 
When a State attempts the extraordinary measure of punishing truthful publication in the 
name of privacy, it must demonstrate its commitment to advancing this interest by 
applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the smalltime disseminator as well as the media 
giant. Where important First Amendment interests are at stake, the mass scope of 
disclosure is not an acceptable surrogate for injury. 
Id. at 540. 
160. Id. at 541. 
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publication of information once lawfully obtained will not survive 
constitutional challenges. 
These cases also close the door to privacy-based actions for damages 
flowing from the publication of truthful information. Indeed, that is what 
dooms cases like Briscoe’s and Melvin’s. But what about Ms. Martin’s 
claims? The Cox line of cases dealt with truthful information. Ms. Martin 
hinged her cause of action on falsity, suing in defamation and false 
light.161 Might an individual whose record was expunged sue for 
defamation or false light, arguing that according to the law, her record no 
longer exists and it is as if she never was accused of or committed the 
acts reported? Unlikely, at least outside the boundaries of Orwell’s 
Oceania. 
IV.  TRUE LIES—FALSITY-BASED CLAIMS 
“I don’t mind being called a liar. I am. I am a marvelous liar. But I hate 
being called a liar when I am telling the perfect truth.”162 
In the case that inspired this Article, Ms. Martin alleged that the 
publication—specifically, the continued availability of the report of her 
arrest—was false as a result of the erasure of that record.163 Can 
expungement give rise to a falsity-based cause of action by transforming 
once-true reports into false reports? To answer this question, I now 
explore defamation and false light, and the requirement of falsity. 
A.  Defamation: The Elements and the Constitution 
To state a claim for defamation, a party must plead a false and 
defamatory publication, of and concerning the plaintiff, made with at 
least negligence, without an applicable privilege.164 Given the subject 
matter involved, the easiest element to prove for the person whose record 
is being expunged is defamatory meaning. The Second Restatement 
defines defamatory communication as one that “tends to so harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community 
or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”165 The 
Restatement further identifies imputation of criminal conduct as among 
the most serious forms of defamatory communication. 166 Thus, reporting 
that someone is guilty of a crime easily clears the threshold. And in light 
 
161. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40 
(2015). 
162. PATRICK ROTHFUSS, THE WISE MAN’S FEAR 1002 (DAW Books, 2011). 
163. Martin, 777 F.3d at 550. 
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
165. Id. at § 559. 
166. Id. at § 570. 
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of the collateral impact of simply having a criminal record, reporting even 
the charge also clears this hurdle.167 The real issues arise with the 
requirement of falsity, especially in light of the constitutionalization of 
the tort of defamation. 
Early common law did not require the plaintiff to prove falsity as an 
element of the prima facie case; the plaintiff was presumed to have a good 
reputation, putting the rabbit in the hat regarding falsity.168 The defendant 
could rebut this by carrying the burden of proving truth as an absolute 
defense.169 But beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the 
Supreme Court constitutionalized the tort of defamation, placing high 
thresholds on some of these elements, especially where the 
communication in question relates to a public figure or a matter of public 
interest. In Sullivan, the Court carved out protection for even false speech 
in order to provide breathing room that the Court reasoned was critical to 
ensure the robust debate essential for a functioning democracy and a free 
society.170 The Court held that in order to recover damages for a false and 
defamatory statement, a public official must show, by clear and 
convincing proof, that the publisher either knew the information 
communicated was false, or acted with reckless disregard for the truth or 
falsity of the information.171 
The Sullivan standard was later extended to public figures engaged in 
matters of public interest.172 Then, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the 
Court held that while a private person (as distinct from a public official 
or public figure) involved in a matter of public interest (as distinct from 
 
167. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Shirvell, 596 F. App’x 433, 442 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 403 (2015) (discussing how the essence of a defamation claim involves harm to a person’s 
reputation); Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 333 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing how a false 
statement that is a matter of public concern must be provable as false before it can be liable under 
defamation law); Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing the 
interplay of opinions and defamation in regards to the press). 
168. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770 (1986) (noting that common 
law presumed that an individual’s reputation is good so statements defaming a person are 
presumptively false). 
169. See id. (noting the common law rule holds that “[s]tatements defaming [a] person 
are . . . presumptively false” but defendant may prove “truth of statements” which provides 
“absolute defense”). 
170. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (placing 
constitutional limits on the states’ ability to impose damages in actions for defamation because of 
the need to give speech breathing room). 
171. See id. (explaining that any other standard of proof would limit public debate and thus free 
speech); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974) (noting that there is a 
competing interest between an individual right and the constitutional right to free speech). 
172. See Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979) (citing Curtis Publ’g 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162–65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)) (explaining further that the 
standard of bringing a defamation action was not expanded to private individuals). 
 
32 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  49 
a private matter) would not be held to the Sullivan actual malice standard, 
the Constitution did impose thresholds on certain elements.173 
Specifically, Gertz held that liability could not be imposed without a 
showing by clear and convincing evidence of at least fault (understood to 
mean at least negligence) with respect to the truth or falsity of the 
publication.174 
Finally, the last piece critical to this analysis comes with Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps. In Hepps, the Court rejected the common law 
rule that presumed falsity and held that the Constitution required the 
plaintiff (even a private figure, at least when the matter was of public 
interest) to carry the burden of pleading and proving falsity.175 
The Sullivan line of cases radically changed the law of defamation by 
taking what had been a virtually strict liability tort for which the key 
element of falsity could be presumed and imposing what often amounts 
to impossibly high barriers to recovery. In doing so, the Court created a 
cottage industry surrounding the questions of who is a public figure, what 
is a matter of public interest, and how the status of the public figure (i.e., 
public official, public figure, general purpose public figure, limited 
purpose public figure, or private figure) intersected with the nature of the 
communication (e.g., matter of public interest or newsworthy 
material).176 
 Are expungees limited purpose public figures, private figures 
involved in matters of public interest, or simply private figures? Some 
courts have categorized criminal defendants as limited purpose public 
figures (public figures for the purpose of their involvement in criminal 
activity or in the criminal process) and are therefore subject to Sullivan’s 
imposition of almost impossible hurdles; other courts have found them to 
be private figures involved in a matter of public interest and so subject to 
the more forgiving Gertz standards.177 Either interpretation requires the 
plaintiff to prove falsity.178 
The Supreme Court has never faced categorizing criminal defendants 
head on, but one Supreme Court decision involving a witness—
 
173. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. In the case of Gertz, the matter involved Elmer Gertz, a lawyer, 
representing the family of a victim who was shot and killed by a police officer in a civil action 
against the police officer. Id. at 325. 
174. Id. at 349–50. 
175. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). 
176. See Victoria C. Duke, Calumnious News Reporting: Defamatory Law Is More Than Sticks 
and Stones for Civic-Duty Participants, 93 NEB. L. REV. 690, 705–21 (2015), for a thorough 
discussion of how the consequences of the decision in Sullivan have played out.  
177. See id. at 717 (emphasizing the lack of conformity among jurisdictions on this question). 
178. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342–43; N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 298–99 (1964). 
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potentially implicated in espionage—provides guidance. In Wolston v. 
Reader’s Digest, Ilya Wolston sued Reader’s Digest for defamation.179 
Wolston was the nephew of two people who pleaded guilty to 
espionage.180 He had been subpoenaed and interviewed several times 
regarding this matter.181 At one point he argued that he should not be 
forced to travel from Washington, D.C., to New York yet again to be 
interviewed about this matter due to his failing mental health.182 
Nonetheless, the court ordered him to appear. 183 He refused.184 He then 
faced a hearing to show cause why he should not be found in contempt.185 
He and his then-pregnant wife appeared to defend his decision at the 
hearing, but after she broke down on the stand, he agreed to plead guilty 
to the contempt charge and was sentenced to a one-year suspended 
sentence with three years of probation conditioned upon his cooperating 
with the investigation of Soviet espionage.186 Newspapers covered this 
fairly extensively at the time, but after about six weeks, the attention died 
down and Wolston “succeeded for the most part in returning to the private 
life he had led prior to issuance of the grand jury subpoena.”187 He was 
never indicted for espionage or accused of being a spy.188 Many years 
later, Reader’s Digest published a book entitled KGB: The Secret Work 
of Soviet Secret Agents which identified Wolston as a KGB agent and a 
Soviet spy—information Wolston alleged was false.189 
In analyzing whether Mr. Wolston was a public figure or a private 
figure, the Court emphasized language from Gertz that focused on the 
individual’s role in “injecting himself” into the controversy, and 
contrasted this with what the Court described as Wolston being “dragged” 
into this matter.190 The Court continued, “[a] court must focus on the 
 
179. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n. Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 160–62 (1979). 
180. Id. at 161. 
181. Id. at 162. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 163. 
186. Id. 
187. See id. (discussing that even though fifteen stories were written both in Washington and 
New York about these events, Wolston succeeded in returning to his normal life). 
188. Id. 
189. See id. at 159 (arguing that a short time after these events there were two publications 
where Wolston was identified as a Soviet agent); JOHN BARRON, KGB: THE SECRET WORK OF 
SOVIET SECRET AGENTS 188 (1974) (demonstrating how simple it was for a person like Wolston 
to be identified in a publication). 
190. See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166–67 (explaining that the fact Wolston voluntarily refrained 
from attending the grand jury hearing for fear of encountering publicity does not automatically 
render him a public figure). In fact, the language from Gertz cited by Wolston was not quite so 
focused on voluntary action by the individual: “More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects 
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‘nature and extent of an individual’s participation in the particular 
controversy giving rise to the defamation.’”191 The Court concluded that 
Wolston, like Elmer Gertz (the lawyer in the Gertz case, who represented 
in a civil case the family of a suspected criminal shot by the police), was 
a private figure involved in a matter of public interest.192 Especially 
relevant here, the Court “reject[ed] the further contention of respondents 
that any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes 
a public figure for purposes of comment on a limited range of issues 
relating to his conviction.”193 The Court seems to instruct us to look at 
the level to which the individual “engaged the attention of the public in 
an attempt to influence the resolution of the issues involved[,]”194 and so 
attained “special prominence in the resolution of public questions. . . .”195 
Courts take differing approaches to applying this analysis in the 
context of criminal defendants. Is the individual’s action in thrusting 
himself or herself into the controversy the crucial determinant? Indeed, 
the Court in Gertz suggested that affirmative action on the part of the 
individual is important, if not critical, observing that an involuntary 
public figure, while theoretically possible, would be “exceedingly 
rare.”196 But should the nature of the controversy—its newsworthiness—
play into the analysis? For example, in a thoughtful opinion, the Kansas 
Supreme Court struggled with this interplay, concluding that the nature 
of the crime had to be considered.197 Thus, while the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Wolston focused on the actions of the individual defendant (contrasting 
Wolston’s lack of voluntary action in being thrust into a controversy with 
the example of a defendant who “use[d] the contempt citation as a 
fulcrum to create public discussion about the methods being used in 
connection with an investigation or prosecution,” and who therefore 
might be found a limited purpose public figure),198 the Kansas court in 
Ruebke considered the sensational nature of the triple murder involved 
 
himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a 
limited range of issues.” Id. at 164 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974)). 
191. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167. 
192. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352). 
193. Id. at 168. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351). 
196. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (explaining that it is extremely unlikely that individuals can 
become public figures without intentional action of their own). 
197. See generally Ruebke v. Globe Commc’ns Corp., 241 Kan. 595, 601 (Kan. 1987) (finding 
that Ruebke was a limited public figure due partially to the fact that the triple murder alleged against 
him “by nature was of great concern to the public,” and this public concern “thrust Ruebke into the 
forefront of public attention”). 
198. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168. 
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and the intense media coverage to find the defendant a limited purpose 
public figure.199 Similarly, in Marcone v. Penthouse International 
Magazine for Men, the Third Circuit found an attorney who was indicted 
for allegedly engaging in drug-related activities with his clients to be a 
public figure.200 The court carefully distinguished Marcone’s activity as 
a lawyer representing drug dealers (in this case, notorious motorcycle 
gangs) with the lawyer’s own conduct of engaging in the activities of the 
gangs.201 In its public figure analysis, the court looked at more than 
Marcone’s actions in thrusting himself into the controversy, explaining: 
[T]he status of public figure vel non does not depend upon the desires 
of an individual. . . . Comment upon people and activities of legitimate 
public concern often illuminates that which yearns for shadow. It is no 
answer to the assertion that one is a public figure to say, truthfully, that 
one doesn’t choose to be. It is sufficient . . . [that the individual] 
voluntarily engaged in a course that was bound to invite attention and 
comment.202 
In the court’s mind, apparently, engaging in the criminal activity itself 
was the course that invited attention and comment, and this was 
significant in finding Marcone a limited purpose public figure.203 Recall, 
a limited purpose public figure is a public figure only with respect to the 
matter of public interest.204 And while it may seem the question answers 
itself, given this analysis, it is worth closing the loop and asking: Are 
criminal activity and criminal procedures matters of public interest? The 
Cox line of cases detailed above, though dealing with the issue from a 
slightly different perspective, answers the question with a firm, yes.205 
With this as background, I turn to the viability of an expungee’s cause of 
action for defamation—a cause of action that must rise or fall on whether 
the expungee can carry the burden of proving falsity.206 
 
199. See Ruebke, 241 Kan. at 600–02 (arguing that what made Ruebke a limited public figure 
was the intense media coverage, Ruebke voluntarily turning himself in, and Ruebke’s arrest and 
indictment for the triple murders).  
200. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1084–86 (3d Cir. 1985). 
201. See id. (explaining that when determining whether someone is a public figure, one should 
look to the individual’s own actions). 
202. Id. at 1084 (quoting Rosanova v. Playboy Enter. Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
203. Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1086. 
204. See supra notes 176–177 (discussing how some courts have categorized criminal 
defendants as limited purpose public figures meaning they are public figures for the purpose of 
their involvement in criminal activity). 
205. See supra notes 141–161 and accompanying text (arguing that criminal activities are 
always a matter of public interest). 
206. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770 (1986). 
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1.  Establishing Falsity: Constructive Falsity 
If an expungee is considered a public figure with respect to her 
criminal activity or charges lodged against her for engaging in criminal 
activity, in an action for defamation she would be required to prove that 
the defendant published the defamatory information with knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.207 If the 
expungee is considered a private figure, and the matter is considered to 
be of public interest, she would still be required to prove falsity, but only 
that the publisher was negligent with respect to the truth or falsity of the 
information.208 In both instances, however, the burden of pleading, 
proving, and persuading that the communication was false falls squarely 
on the plaintiff, who must prove this element by at least a preponderance 
of the evidence.209 Nat Stern aptly described this as making falsity part 
of the intrinsic character of a defamation claim.210 Stern’s illumination of 
the import of this constitutionally driven requirement correctly grasps 
falsity as essential to a defamation claim, and so informs my analysis. 
In order for an expungee to prevail in a defamation claim under the 
scenarios I have been considering, meeting the Court’s constitutionally 
driven “demonstrably-false” requirement would require the Court to 
accept a notion of constructive falsity—that is, falsity created by 
operation of the expungement law that retroactively changes or erases the 
facts of the expungee’s arrest, conviction, or charge. As noted above, the 
way the law wields the concept of “constructive” may in fact provide a 
way to understand all forms of expungement. That is, constructive means 
establishing something that is not and deeming it to be so. We wave our 
wand and transform “the character assigned to it in its own essential 
nature” by operation of “the mind of the law in its act of construing facts, 
conduct, [or] circumstances” to make it what we want it to be.211 The 
thing acquires that character “in consequence of the way in which it is 
 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. See id. at 776 (discussing that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing falsity before 
recovering damages). 
210. Nat Stern, The Intrinsic Character of Defamatory Content as Grounds for a Uniform 
Regime of Proving Libel, 80 MISS. L.J. 1, 17–18 (2010). 
211. Constructive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Revised 4th ed. 1968) (emphasis removed); 
see also Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1437 (2007) (explaining how 
“common law legal fiction treated as true a factual assertion that plainly was false . . . ”). 
Villanova’s law school chaplain, a non-lawyer and Augustinian friar, once asked as he puzzled over 
the law school calendar which described a Monday in December as a “constructive Thursday” what 
the term meant. After hearing the explanation (“Well, see Jack, it’s a fiction.”), he chuckled, “So 
you just make stuff up and call it a legal concept? Awesome!” The clarity of vision, uninhibited 
curiosity and straightforward manner Father Jack Denny, OSA, brought to our friendship and the 
law school are much missed since his untimely death in 2016. 
 
2017] Expungement, Defamation, and False Light 37 
regarded by a rule or policy of law . . . implied [or] made out by legal 
interpretation.”212 Expungement takes something that happened and 
decrees that it did not, or at least that any record of its happening 
conceptually does not exist; the individual involved can “truthfully” 
answer, “No, this did not happen,” to a question asking about the 
expunged facts (which did, of course, happen). It defies the observation 
quoted in the title of this Article that “what happened before is what really 
happened,”213 refuting it with Orwellian logic.214 
This surely represents good policy in the context of expungement’s 
criminal justice goals. The effects of expungement must be applied 
beyond the narrow confines of the criminal record itself to have any hope 
of mitigating the devastating collateral consequences of a criminal 
record—consequences so eloquently described by Judge Gleeson in 
explaining his decision to craft a Federal Certificate of Rehabilitation.215 
But, as Judge Gleeson216 and so many commentators have noted, 
although we would both forgive and forget the criminal history of a 
rehabilitated individual in a perfect world, we cannot achieve perfection 
in reality.217 
 
212. Constructive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Revised 4th ed. 1968). 
213. See Marshall, supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing how the past is always with 
us, and even though it may be said a person is someone new, the past happened first). 
214. ORWELL, supra note 2, at 213. “[T]he past is whatever the Party chooses to make 
it . . . [W]hen it has been re-created in whatever shape is needed at the moment, then this new 
version [IS] the past, and no different past can ever have existed.” ORWELL, supra note 2, at 213. 
215. See Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 445–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (explaining that 
the consequences are not mere trivialities, such as ineligibility to enlist in the military, to serve on 
a federal jury, and to receive government benefits); id. at 445 (explaining that even though the 
majority of states do not issue a certificate, the “federal system has much to gain from a certification 
system”); see also Joy Radice, Administering Justice: Removing Statutory Barriers to Reentry, 83 
U. COLO. L. REV. 715, 719 (2012) (citing Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need 
for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154 
(1999) (stating that collateral consequences “can be more punitive and permanent than a person’s 
actual criminal sentence”)). 
216. Doe, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 446. 
217. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 5, at 327, 343 (discussing the crippling effects of a criminal 
record and how sealing and expungement laws are just one way to solve this problem); Rebecca 
Vallas & Sharon Dietrich, One Strike and You're Out: How We Can Eliminate Barriers to 
Economic Security and Mobility for People with Criminal Records, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 34 
(2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/VallasCriminalRecordsReport.pdf (discussing a criminal record’s 
potential longstanding effects on a person’s economic security, family, and community); Jenny 
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 286–89 (2011) (explaining that even misdemeanors can have long 
lasting negative effects, especially in an age characterized by access to criminal records available 
at the click of a button); Wade, supra note 71, at 23 (arguing that California’s legislative efforts to 
limit the harsh effects of a criminal record have not been effective, especially given the 
technological developments that have manifested since the legislation was adopted); Starting Over, 
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We have already seen that efforts to erase or rewrite history have 
limited effect—as futile as attempting to re-capture feathers let loose 
from a pillow cut open on a rooftop.218 Similarly, efforts to impose 
liability for disclosure of the facts of a criminal record by deeming them 
constructively false and imposing defamation damages will not work. 
Constructive falsity would allow us to assume the falsity of the report of 
a criminal record while simultaneously understanding full well that the 
presumption of falsity is not fact.219 Would the Court permit such sleight 
of hand? A fair reading of the Supreme Court’s opinions counsel that it 
would not. Stern has insightfully described falsity as the “intrinsic 
element” of defamation—an intrinsic element firmly anchored as 
constitutionally required. In rejecting the common law presumption of 
falsity applied to defamatory speech and imposing the requirement that 
private-party, public-matter plaintiffs must plead, prove, and persuade on 
the element of falsity, the Court understood the potential for unfairness 
for deserving defamation plaintiffs who might not be able to meet the 
burden of proof, even though the speech involved was in fact false, 
defamatory, and damaging.220 The Court observed that on the facts of 
Hepps itself, the impact of Pennsylvania’s Shield Statute made imposing 
the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff even more onerous—perhaps 
impossible—because the media defendants could invoke the Shield 
Statute and refuse to divulge their sources, critical to the plaintiff’s ability 
to prove falsity and reckless disregard.221 Nonetheless, the Court 
reasoned that in order to provide the breathing room necessary to protect 
speech, it was willing to insulate even demonstrably false speech from 
 
supra note 59, at 1717–34 (explaining the unforgiving nature of the American criminal justice 
system and proposing a legal framework to “limit the scope and duration of collateral legal 
penalties”). 
218. See supra notes 107–113 and accompanying text (explaining that the efforts to redact 
names only consider certain locations, which leaves remaining information in other places). 
219. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 319 (2013) (“A legal 
fiction is often a ‘factual statement a judge, a legal scholar or a lawyer tells, while simultaneously 
understanding full well—and also understanding that the audience understands—that the statement 
is not fact.’”). 
220. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 (1986) (illustrating the 
Court’s understanding). The Court acknowledged, 
There will always be instances when the factfinding process will be unable to resolve 
conclusively whether the speech is true or false; it is in those cases that the burden of 
proof is dispositive. Under a rule forcing the plaintiff to bear the burden of showing 
falsity, there will be some cases in which plaintiffs cannot meet their burden despite the 
fact that the speech is in fact false. The plaintiff’s suit will fail despite the fact that, in 
some abstract sense, the suit is meritorious. 
Id. at 776. 
221. Id. at 778–79. 
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liability.222 
Moreover, the Court’s application of its Sullivan jurisprudence in the 
context of rhetorical hyperbole and parody reinforces the message that 
the requirement of demonstrable falsity will be strictly enforced. In 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the parody ad in question purported to 
quote evangelist Jerry Falwell describing his “first time” as happening 
with his mother in an outhouse.223 The Court reasoned that parody cannot 
be shown to involve facts, and therefore cannot be shown demonstrably 
false.224 Outrageous, harmful and untrue, perhaps, but not false.225 
Therefore, the Court reasoned, the Constitution will not permit the 
imposition of damages, even in the face of outrageous conduct and 
verifiable harm.226 
This leads to the conclusion that the Court will not destabilize its 
holding in Hepps, and indeed the entire Sullivan line of cases, by 
permitting constructive falsity—a legal fiction—to establish the very 
element the Court found constitutionally essential to the cause of action. 
At best, fictions are viewed with suspicion. Lisa Kern Griffin suggests 
that the very name “reveals an underlying sense that there is something 
dangerously deceptive about them.”227 Hepps rejected the use of fiction 
when it disallowed application of the long-standing concept of 
presumptive falsity (a form of fiction) and imposed the burden on the 
plaintiff to prove falsity with convincing clarity, finding the presumption 
of falsity constitutionally impermissible.228 The fiction of constructive 
 
222. See id. (discussing the First Amendment’s requirement that in defamation cases the Court 
will protect some falsehood and thereby protect speech that matters). 
223. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988) (explaining that this parody was 
modeled after actual comparison advertisements that included interviews with celebrities about 
their first time drinking Campari Liqueur). 
224. Id. at 48–50 (determining parody “could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating 
actual facts about the public figure involved[,]” and if something is not factual, it cannot be shown 
to be false). 
225. Id. at 50. 
226. Id.; see also Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (noting that 
the word “blackmail” used to criticize public official’s bargaining tactics was “no more than 
rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet[,]” and therefore could not support action for defamation). 
227. Griffin, supra note 219, at 320. Griffin emphasizes her point, citing the movie A Civil 
Action, where a lawyer explains that the judge will ask “the jury to ‘create a fiction that will stand 
for the truth, but won’t be the truth.’” Id. at 304 n.125 (quoting A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone 
Pictures 1998)). To be fair, the single publication rule discussed above is itself a legal fiction, but 
one which the Supreme Court has embraced. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 
777 (1984). The Court noted that the rule prevented the unnecessary “drain of libel cases on judicial 
resources” and protected defendants from harassment resulting from multiple suits. Id. In Keeton, 
the rule inured to the benefit of the plaintiff who was able to invoke the rule to shop for the longest 
defamation statute of limitation in the country. Id. at 778–81. 
228. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 (1986). 
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falsity would be rooted in a presumption even more constitutionally 
unsound: it would take a constitutionally required element and, in the face 
of actual knowledge to the contrary, declare it established. The 
parody/rhetorical hyperbole line of cases even more convincingly 
compels this conclusion. If the Court would not weaken the requirement 
of factual falsity by finding false implication in the parody cases, 
including one as outrageous as the Falwell parody, it cannot be expected 
to permit an expungee to wave the magic wand of expungement over the 
verifiable and truthful facts in an official public record of a criminal or 
judicial proceeding, and in doing so, deem them (constructively) false. 
2.  Establishing Falsity: Changed Circumstances 
An expungee might take another tack in seeking to establish falsity, an 
approach suggested by the facts of the Martin case. Implicit in Lorraine 
Martin’s demand that the media defendants “correct” their reports (that 
is, delete them) to reflect the erasure of her criminal record, and her 
subsequent claims for defamation and false light based on their refusal to 
do so, is the notion that failure to delete the reports causes the once-true 
information to become false.229 The theory posits that information, which 
was true when it was published, could become false for the purpose of 
imposing liability in a defamation action by virtue of subsequent events 
or changed circumstances.230 This, so the reasoning goes, is especially so 
in the context of online publications, primarily because they are easily 
searchable and are arguably republished each time a reader searches and 
pulls up the article.231 Further, unlike the case of print publications, it is 
relatively simple to delete the article entirely (except, of course, for 
already downloaded versions). 
At least for media defendants, this theory will not work to establish 
 
229. This was not directly addressed by the Martin court, but the issue was raised in the 
defendant’s brief. See Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 10–21, Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 
546 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-3315-cv) [hereinafter “Brief for the Defendants”] (arguing that 
Connecticut’s Erasure Statute is limited to expunging official government records of criminal 
charges that are not pursued, and does not impose a duty on the press to withdrawal or update 
reports of erased charges); see also Brief for the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellees at 11–14, Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546 
(2d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-3315-cv) [hereinafter “Amicus Curiae Brief”] (citing Strada v. Conn. 
Newspapers, Inc., 477 A.2d 1005, 1010 (Conn. 1984) (arguing that “[j]ournalism would be 
impossible if subjects of stories could routinely sue over material that they would have liked to see 
included in the story,” and adding that “an omission can constitute libel only when there are 
‘additional material facts which, if reported, would have changed the tone of the article’”)). 
230. Brief for the Defendants, supra note 229, at 10–21; Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 229, 
at 11–14. 
231. Brief for the Defendants, supra note 229, at 10–21; Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 229, 
at 11–14. 
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falsity because of the operation of the single publication rule. The single 
publication rule, which has been universally adopted, provides that “[a]ny 
one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or television 
broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate 
communication” constitutes just one publication and gives rise to one 
cause of action.232 The single publication rule most often arises when 
courts must determine when the statute of limitations begins to run.233 
Functionally, it means a defamatory publication must be judged at the 
moment of its first publication.234 That is, all the elements of a cause of 
action must be assessed at a single moment of publication—to wit, that 
there was a communication, of and concerning the plaintiff, that is 
defamatory and demonstrably false.235 
As with any emerging technology, the advent of online publications 
raised the question of whether the single publication rule would apply to 
online media. The majority of courts considering the question have held 
that the single publication rule applies to online publications, and the fact 
that each view “reloads” the article does not make each view a new 
publication.236 The New York case of Firth v. State has been cited as the 
most influential of these rulings.237 Firth and the other cases finding that 
 
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
233. See Note, The Single Publication Rule in Libel: A Fiction Misapplied, 62 HARV. L. REV. 
1041, 1042 (1949) (exhibiting the single publication most frequently used to determine when libel 
action is barred by statute of limitations); see, e.g., Adeline A. Allen, Twibel Retweeted: Twitter 
Libel and the Single Publication Rule, 15 J. HIGH TECH. L. 63, 66 (2014) (discussing the single 
publication rule, but only in the context of statutes of limitations); see also “Single Publication 
Rule” Applied Online, 7 No. 5 Cyberspace Law. 17 (July/Aug. 2002) (noting that the single 
publication rule is applied by courts to “determine statute of limitations”). 
234. See Lori A. Wood, Cyber-Defamation and the Single Publication Rule, 81 B.U. L. REV. 
895, 897–99 (2001) (noting that common law traditionally treated each of a party’s several 
communications as a separate publication, and that the single publication rule “developed . . . in 
response to the problems caused by the advent of mass publication” to protect defendants from 
“multiple lawsuits and undue harassment that might result from the dissemination of large-scale 
communication”); see, e.g., Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 465 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that although 
a website may be altered or viewed multiple times after publication, the statute of limitations is not 
retriggered). 
235. Wood, supra note 234, at 898 (“[The single publication rule] combines the right to a cause 
of action in each jurisdiction where the defendant disseminated the defamatory material into a 
single cause of action in any one jurisdiction where the dissemination occurred.”). 
236. See, e.g., Pippen v. NBC Universal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Every 
state court that has considered the question applies the single-publication rule to information 
online.”); see also Wood, supra note 234, at 895–96, 899 (noting that the trend in the majority of 
jurisdictions is to apply the single publication rule to Internet publications and quoting Chief Justice 
Deyer of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, who recognizes the single publication rule allows a 
single wrong for a single publication). 
237. See Nationwide Bi-Weekly Admin., Inc. v. Belo Corp., 512 F.3d 137, 143–44 (5th Cir. 
2007) (noting that most courts considering the issue applied single publication rule to Internet 
publications and that most influential case on the issue is Firth v. State). The small handful of courts 
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the single publication rule applies to online publications get it right. 
Indeed, conceptually, accessing an online source must be understood as 
the digital equivalent of pulling a book off a shelf or pulling a newspaper 
off the rack in a library periodicals room. As the court reasoned in Firth, 
rather than supporting the argument that the single publication rule does 
not apply to online publications, the nature of the Internet makes an even 
more compelling case for applying the single publication rule.238 
Otherwise, the publisher would face “endless retriggering of the statute 
of limitations, multiplicity of suits and harassment of defendants. 
Inevitably, there would be a serious inhibitory effect on the open, 
pervasive dissemination of information and ideas over the Internet, which 
is, of course, its greatest beneficial promise.”239 
As applied, the single publication rule mandates that a snapshot is 
taken at the moment of publication, and that snapshot defines the 
publication for purposes of suit. Thus, the single publication rule 
functions to require that all elements of the cause of action exist at the 
moment of publication.240 Therefore, the single publication rule, applied 
here, forecloses an argument that by not removing the original report after 
expungement or erasure, the once-true information became false. It had 
to be false at the moment of publication, and it was not. 
 
that have found the single publication rule does not apply to online publications in recent years 
have relied on particular factors that distinguish the cases. See, e.g., Larue v. Brown, 333 P.3d 767, 
772–73 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (finding the single publication rule did apply to online publications 
generally, but the fact that publication drew comments from readers and publishers responded 
constituted republication); Swafford v. Memphis Individual Prac. Assoc., No. 02A01-9612-CV-
0031, 1998 WL 281935, at *8–11 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 1998) (finding the publication in 
question, which was one of many reports contained in online database updated with new reports 
and accessed by individual readers, was not subject to single publication rule because there was no 
“aggregate publication”). 
238. Firth, 775 N.E.2d at 466. 
239. Id. The court observed: 
[M]any Web sites are in a constant state of change, with information posted sequentially 
on a frequent basis. For example, this Court has a Web site which includes its decisions, 
to which it continually adds its slip opinions as they are handed down. Similarly, Web 
sites are used by news organizations to provide readily accessible records of newsworthy 
events as they occur and are reported. . . . A rule applying the republication exception 
under the circumstances here would either discourage the placement of information on 
the Internet or slow the exchange of such information, reducing the Internet’s unique 
advantages. In order not to retrigger the statute of limitations, a publisher would be 
forced either to avoid posting on a Web site or use a separate site for each new piece of 
information. 
Id. at 467. 
240. See Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615 (noting claim for relief for defamation is complete at the time 
of first publication). 
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B.  False Light 
Before moving on, it is appropriate to take a moment to consider 
whether defamation’s step-sibling, false light, might offer the expungee 
a viable cause of action. To establish a claim for false light, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant publicized a matter concerning the plaintiff 
that placed the plaintiff in a false light.241 That false light must be “highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.”242 At its heart, false light is a 
defamation cause of action lurking within Prosser’s original four privacy 
torts. Its contours are vague, and it is not clear exactly how “highly 
offensive” falsity differs from “defamatory” falsity, but most consider it 
a lower standard.243 Defamatory falsity focuses on verifiable and serious 
injury to reputation.244 Definitions of defamatory falsity typically require 
the utterance to subject the individual to “obloquy, odium, shame, 
disgrace or other forms of discredit or harm to reputation[,]” and cause 
the person to be shunned or avoided.245 The Restatement goes right to the 
point, stating that a defamatory communication “tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community. . . .”246 On the other hand, false light cases turn “entirely on 
falsity rather than [reputational] harm; the actual and substantial injury 
element needed to maintain the case has become an easily satisfied 
formality which seems really to mean only that the plaintiff was irritated 
enough to sue.”247 Many commentators criticize false light because, as 
noted above, it is duplicative of defamation. Further, to the extent an 
independent cause of action exists, it provides a remedy for an 
inconsequential “harm” and, by evading some of defamation’s strict 
requirements, it threatens the very free and robust speech the Court’s 
 
241. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who gives 
publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is 
subject to liability. . . . ”). 
242. Id. at § 652E(a). 
243. See supra notes 232–233 and accompanying text (discussing the false light doctrine in 
conjunction with the single publication doctrine). 
244. See Eric Meyer Raudenbush, Note, Variations on a Theme: Application of Masson v. New 
Yorker Magazine, Inc. to a Spectrum of Misquotation Libel Cases, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1441, 
1476 n.29 (1991) (noting that “the elements of the false light tort . . . are substantially analogous to 
those of the libel tort, although the false light action is designed to compensate the plaintiff for 
injured feelings, as opposed to injured reputation”). 
245. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1127 (2000). Dobbs indicates these terms “refer to 
the same general idea.” Id. 
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). While most definitions 
of defamatory meaning focus on injury to reputation, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the Supreme Court 
held that harm to reputation was not constitutionally required, and permitted recovery under Florida 
law for personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering. 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976). 
247. Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 364, 396 (1989). 
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Sullivan line of cases seeks to protect.248 Most troubling, some courts 
have found that the publication of even truthful information can give rise 
to a false light claim if that truthful information can be construed to imply 
something false and offensive.249 Diane Zimmerman warned of the 
danger in permitting claims of false light by implication, which she notes 
can be used to permit “recoveries for false light claims based on a series 
of dubious inferences.”250 
Despite scholarly hostility toward false light claims, a number of 
jurisdictions recognize the cause of action.251 Does false light provide a 
remedy for the expungee? Again, the answer must be no, and again 
because of the requirement of falsity. In Time v. Hill, the Supreme Court 
extended the Sullivan constitutional mandates to false light claims, 
requiring, at least in the context of matters of public interest, that the 
defendant have published the material with “knowledge that the 
statement was false or with reckless disregard for” its truth or falsity.252 
The falsity may be directly stated, or implied by manipulation of 
information, but falsity is still the essence of the tort. Thus, in false light, 
as in defamation, falsity provides the fulcrum, or using Stern’s language, 
the intrinsic character of the claim is falsity—an essential element 
mandated by the Constitution.253 While the Supreme Court has not said 
so specifically, the logic of its jurisprudence in this area drives the 
conclusion that in false light, as in defamation, the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof with respect to falsity.254 Again, the expungee cannot 
 
248. See, e.g., Sandra F. Chance & Christina M. Locke, When Even the Truth Isn’t Good 
Enough: Judicial Inconsistency in False Light Case Threatens Free Speech, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 546, 568–71 (2011) (discussing the inconsistencies with the First Amendment values and the 
false light claim); James B. Lake, Restraining False Light: Constitutional and Common Law Limits 
on a “Troublesome Tort”, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 625, 627, 639–40 (2009) (arguing that because the 
First Amendment and false light claims are inconsistent, jurisdictions should impose the limits of 
defamation law on false light); J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 783, 785, 883, 886–87 (1992) (showing how false light does not add anything distinctive); 
Zimmerman, supra note 247, at 397–402 (discussing the Sullivan line of cases and false light 
claims). 
249. See Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 10-cv-1710, 2013 WL 1286662, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 
2013) (explaining false light can be established when the defendant selectively published, 
knowingly or recklessly, truthful statements in a manner which created a false impression, and this 
despite accuracy of individual statements because of the intentional presentation of material in a 
manner that creates the false inference), aff’d, 744 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2014). 
250. Zimmerman, supra note 247, at 416. 
251. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E: Case Citations (AM. LAW INST. 1977) 
(defining the cause of action of false light and listing cases from most states). 
252. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967). 
253. Stern, supra note 210, at 17–18. 
254. See, e.g., Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating “defendant may not 
be held liable for the tort of false light” absent “proof of falsity and some level of fault”). The 
Supreme Court has not directly spoken on whether Hepps applies to false light causes of action, 
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prove falsity when what is published is truthful information obtained 
from a public record. 
Constructive falsity would not work any better to satisfy the 
requirement of falsity here than in the context of defamation. As noted, 
the Supreme Court has applied its Sullivan jurisprudence to false light.255 
Therefore, the Court’s insistence on proof of falsity as essential to the 
cause of action forecloses invoking constructive falsity as shown by the 
analysis above. Even applying the dubious false-light-by-implication 
doctrine does not help the expungee. To the extent there is an implication 
(as opposed to an outright statement), the implication is true. 
Similarly, the single publication rule, which is applied to false light 
cases, forecloses an argument that the subsequent expungement or 
erasure would render the original truthful report false.256 
V.  FORCING “CORRECTION” OF THE RECORD? 
Turning back to the case that inspired this Article, did Ms. Martin 
perhaps get it close to right in the first place? Recall the facts of that case: 
Following Lorraine Martin’s arrest and the filing of drug charges against 
her, online news outlets published articles reporting the arrests and 
charges.257 When the state did not prosecute the charges against Ms. 
 
but given its holding and rationale in Falwell, which applied Hepps to an action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, it is reasonable to conclude, as the court in Machleder did, that 
Hepps will apply to false light causes of action. See id. (citing Hepps when determining there must 
be proof of falsity and fault); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) 
(holding that there must be a false statement of fact and actual malice in order to recover). 
255. See supra notes 252–254 and accompanying text (noting that in Hill, 385 U.S. at 387–88, 
the Supreme Court extended the Sullivan constitutional mandate to false light claims). 
256. See Graboff v. Am. Ass’n of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 559 F. App’x 191, 194–95 (3d Cir. 
2014) (applying the single publication rule to false light, which the court found very similar to 
defamation, and finding that a continuously posted Internet article did not constitute separate acts 
of republication); Hoai Thanh v. Ngo, Civ. No. PJM 14-448, 2016 WL 3958584, at *4–5 (D. Md. 
July 22, 2016) (applying single publication rule to false light claim and noting that to overcome the 
rule, plaintiff must show that material was republished, rather than merely available online) aff’d 
sub nom, Hoai Thanh v. Hien T. Ngo, No. 17-1110, 2017 WL 3327821 (4th Cir. Aug. 4, 2017) (per 
curium, unpublished decision); Parnigoni v. St. Columba’s Nursery Sch., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 
(D.D.C. 2010) (single publication rule applies to false light claims). 
257. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40 
(2015). The first article reported: 
A mother and her two sons were arrested and charged with numerous drug violations 
Aug. 20 after police received information that a pair of brothers were selling marijuana 
in town. The arrests were part of a two-month-long investigation, which came to a head 
last week when police executed a search and seizure warrant. Police arrested Edward 
Martin, 22, Christopher Martin, 20, and their mother, Lorraine Martin, 52, all of 382 
Riversville Road. Police said 12 grams of marijuana, scales, plastic bags and drug 
paraphernalia were found inside the residence. 
Debra Friedman, Mother and Son Charged with Drug Offenses, GREENWICH TIME (Aug. 26, 2010, 
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Martin, and ultimately entered a nolle prosequi, the arrest records were 
erased (actually sealed, but with real juice behind the sealing) pursuant to 
Connecticut’s Erasure Statute, and Ms. Martin requested that the 
publications remove the story of her arrest and charge.258 The 
publications refused.259 The report remained available online, and can be 
accessed even now.260 Suppose instead of asking the publications to 
delete the report, she asked instead that they publish a correction or a 
clarification—specifically to report the accurate facts that the charges 
were never prosecuted and her record had been expunged? Such an 
approach extrapolates from retraction statutes that operate in defamation 
law. 
In the context of defamation actions, some jurisdictions allow a 
defendant to mitigate the damages owed to the plaintiff, or to avoid the 
possibility of punitive damages, by preemptively retracting the 
defamatory statements.261 Other jurisdictions require the plaintiff to 
request a retraction and give the publisher the opportunity to do so before 
seeking certain types of damages.262 Might these retraction statutes 
provide support for requiring a clarification or a correction? Probably not. 
To begin with, the situations are materially different in two ways: First, 
retraction statutes, by definition, apply to communications that are 
punishable—that is, they assume the communications in question are 
arguably false and defamatory.263 Despite the broad-reaching impact of 
its Sullivan line of cases, the Supreme Court has never held that 
defamatory statements themselves are worthy of constitutional 
protection. Rather, the Court realized that truthful speech needs breathing 
 
8:06 PM), http://www.greenwichtime.com/local/article/Mother-and-sons-charged-with-drug-
offenses-633280.php. 
258. Martin, 777 F. 3d at 549. 
259. Id. 
260. See e.g., Friedman, supra note 257 (for example, as of the time this Article was published, 
the Greenwich Time article could be accessed online). 
261. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 770.02 (2017) (barring plaintiff from recovering punitive damages 
if defendant publishes retraction); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11 (2017) (prohibiting plaintiff from 
recovering punitive damages if defendant publishes retraction or if plaintiff fails to request 
retraction); MASS. GEN. LAWS 231 § 93 (2016) (allowing defendant to use retraction as way to 
mitigate damages recoverable by plaintiff); WIS. STAT. § 895.05 (2016) (barring plaintiff from 
recovering punitive damages if defendant publishes timely correction). 
262. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 1975 § 6-5-186 (2016) (requiring plaintiff to ask for retraction five 
days prior to filing suit and for defendant to refuse to retract for plaintiff to be eligible to recover 
punitive damages); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West 2016) (allowing plaintiff to only recover 
special damages unless he or she demands retraction and is refused); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.210 
(2017) (requiring plaintiff to either demand retraction or show that defendant “intended to defame 
the plaintiff” to be able to recover general damages); WIS. STAT. § 895.05 (2017) (requiring 
plaintiff to ask for retraction before filing suit). 
263. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing several state retraction statutes). 
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room, and free and robust debate requires some margin of error to avoid 
a chilling effect.264 So, the false and defamatory statement itself is not 
worthy of protection. Rather, to avoid chilling robust debate, courts do 
not permit the law to cut too close to the bone in imposing damages.265 In 
short, to avoid making speakers timorous and risking stifling truthful 
speech, some false speech must slip through. But that false speech itself 
does not have constitutional value. The cases hold that under the proper 
circumstances (that is, clearing the Sullivan bar), courts can impose 
penalties (or in this case, burdens) on false and defamatory speech.266 
This forms the foundation for the retraction statutes—they impose a 
burden, but only on publishers of defamatory speech. However, the 
expungees’ cases involve publication of truthful speech, which is 
constitutionally protected.267 This represents an important distinction. 
Second, the retraction statutes do not require that a retraction or 
correction be printed.268 Instead, the statutes provide a means to mitigate 
damages in a suit by permitting the defendant to elect to publish a 
retraction in response to a suit or to the defamed person’s timely request 
to do so.269 By contrast, the remedy of requiring correction would 
mandate that a media outlet publish additional information amending an 
original report to reflect the fact that the criminal record reported on was 
expunged. This falls squarely in the First Amendment bramble bush of 
compelled speech. 
The Supreme Court is nimble and imaginative in interpreting the 
simple words “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press. . . .”270 The Court did not hesitate to read 
 
264. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341, 348 (1974) (recognizing that “[t]he 
First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters,” 
but also “the individual’s right to the protection of his own good name”). 
265. See id. at 348 (establishing a “boundary between the competing concerns,” that of “the 
legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation,” 
while at the same time “shield[ing] the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability 
for defamation”). 
266. The Sullivan line of cases, discussed supra notes 170–206, set out the circumstances. See, 
e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (stating that a public official may 
“recover[] damages for defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct” only if “he proves that 
the statement was made with” knowledge or reckless disregard for truth or falsity); see also Gertz, 
418 U.S. at 347 (“[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may 
[set] . . . standard of liability for a publisher . . . of defamatory falsehood.”). 
267. See e.g. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777-78 (1986) (noting that the 
Constitution requires plaintiffs to bear the burden of showing the speech at issue is false); Garrison 
v. State of La., 379 U.S. 64, 73-74, 78 (1964) (applying the rule of New York Times v. Sullivan, 
holding that the Constitution absolutely prohibits punishment of truthful speech). 
268. See supra note 262 and accompanying text (noting several state retraction statutes). 
269. See id. 
270. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Miami Herald Publ’g. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–
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“abridging” to include compelling speech when it comes to government 
interference with speech. 
While some commentators have observed that the entirety of the 
Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence can be hard to reconcile, that 
critique only applies to some of the less concrete applications (for 
example, requiring union dues that go to political causes, or requiring 
property owners to permit demonstrators to express their views on 
property open to the public).271 In cases of true compelled speech, where 
a speaker is forced to express content that is not the speaker’s own (such 
as the proposal to force media outlets to add information about 
expungements to published reports of criminal records), the Court has 
spoken clearly, striking down such attempts. In Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo, the Court unanimously struck down a Florida statute 
requiring newspapers that published criticisms of candidates for public 
office to publish the candidates’ responses to the criticisms.272 The Court 
found that “[c]ompelling editors or publishers to publish that which 
‘reason tells them should not be published’ . . . operates as a command in 
the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish 
specified matter.”273 The Court also concluded that forcing a newspaper 
to allocate space and resources to the mandated responses exacted a 
penalty, specifically the cost of printing and the necessity to allocate 
limited resources to the reply instead of other content.274 The Court added 
an important concern with intrusion into the editorial process: 
 
57 (1974) (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244–45 (1936)) (“Governmental 
restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to 
constitutional limitations on governmental powers.”); supra notes 141–161 and accompanying text 
(citing to United States Supreme Court cases where the issue presented was the restriction of 
publication of criminal records and proceedings). 
271. See Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights 
After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1048–50 (2013) (discussing what 
constitutes compelled speech). 
272. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247, 258 (1974). In contrast, the Court has permitted similar right to 
reply provisions to be applied to broadcast media, citing the fact that the airwaves are finite, 
requiring the government to allocate them; thus, broadcasters hold a license as trustees of the public. 
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969) (holding that an FCC order 
requiring radio station to provide a person attacked in broadcast with time for response, among 
other things, did not violate the First Amendment because, “of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, 
the Government’s role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable 
without governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views,” 
reasoning that “existing broadcasters have often attained their present position because of their 
initial government selection in competition . . . [resulting in] advantages [that] are the fruit of a 
preferred position conferred by the Government”). Whether this rationale will continue to justify 
the distinction in light of the extraordinary expansion of broadcast capacity remains to be seen. 
273. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256 (quoting Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 244–45). 
274. Id. at 256–57 (explaining that as an economic reality, the newspaper cannot indefinitely 
expand its space to accommodate the mandated responses). 
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Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a 
compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of 
news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to 
clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into 
the function of editors.275 
On its face, Tornillo appears to foreclose the proposal to require 
publishers to print corrections or amendments to their published reports. 
To be sure, there are differences that matter here. But are they enough to 
clear the Court’s concerns? 
As noted above, online publications should be considered conceptually 
comparable to traditional publications.276 But there are differences. 
Adding a correction to an online report can be done quite easily and with 
minimum cost. And, while accessing an online report and pulling a 
newspaper in a library are in principle the same, the fact that search 
engines make the online version much more easily accessible might 
justify imposing a modest burden to correct the report. However, the 
Court’s holding in Tornillo likely forecloses this option as well. As noted 
above, in addition to the burden imposed by the expense, the Court was 
concerned about insinuating government into the editorial process.277 The 
Court expressed concern that requiring the publication of candidates’ 
replies would necessarily result in the publisher not being able to print 
other content, causing impermissible intrusion on the editorial process.278 
In addition, the Court worried that the specter of being forced to publish 
replies might make publishers become cautious about reporting on 
candidates—the archetypal robust debate the First Amendment 
protects.279 So, while the expense or commitment of resources might be 
minimal for an online publisher required to publish a correction or 
clarification of its report, the insinuation of the government into the 
editorial process still represents a real and dangerous threat—indeed, it 
might be the real danger. The Court in Tornillo foreshadowed this 
possibility and noted its concern: “The choice of material to go into a 
 
275. Id. at 258. 
276. See supra Part IV.A.2 (explaining that an “online source must be understood as the digital 
equivalent of pulling a book off a shelf or pulling a newspaper off the rack in a library periodicals 
room”). 
277. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257 (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)) 
(“[U]nder the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or 
reduced. Government-enforced right of access inescapably ‘dampens the vigor and limits the 
variety of public debate.’”). 
278. Id. (“[I]t is not correct to say that, as an economic reality, a newspaper can proceed to 
infinite expansion of its column space to accommodate the replies that a government agency 
determines or a statute commands the readers should have available.”). 
279. Id. (suggesting that editors may choose to avoid controversy and thus reduce political 
coverage). 
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newspaper . . . and treatment of public issues and public officials—
whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and 
judgment.”280 The Court could not see “how governmental regulation of 
this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment 
guarantees. . . .”281 
VI.  A MODEST PROPOSAL: VOLUNTARY CORRECTION 
In the end, law cannot fix the problems created by the existence and 
truthful reporting of a criminal record, at least without doing serious 
damage to First Amendment principles. Government mandated 
publication of corrections will not work either. Thus, most of the potential 
fixes threaten grave harm to essential constitutional principles, and in all 
likelihood, fall well short of offering a real remedy anyway. If the law 
cannot fix what clearly amounts to a severe and unjust harm, are there 
any other options? Perhaps. 
While the Constitution bars the government from requiring a news 
source to publish amending or correcting information, journalists could 
voluntarily agree to do so as a best practice. Journalists do not have a 
binding code of ethics comparable to lawyers, but they do have guiding 
principles and voluntary ethics rules. For example, the Society of 
Professional Journalists (“SPJ”) publishes a non-binding code that was 
updated as recently as 2014.282 SPJ describes the code as “a statement of 
abiding principles,” noting that the code “is not a set of rules,” but “rather 
a guide that encourages all who engage in journalism to take 
responsibility for the information they provide, regardless of the 
medium.”283 Further, most news outlets publish their own codes of ethics 
and hold their reporters accountable to these codes.284 
Despite popular disdain for the media, journalists traditionally aspire 
to high standards, while wrestling with how to get to the news, get it right, 
 
280. Id. at 258. 
281. Id. 
282. See generally SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PROF’L JOURNALISM (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49 
PM), http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp [hereinafter “SPJ Code of Ethics”] (demonstrating that 
journalists have aspirational but not binding codes of ethics). 
283. Id. 
284. See, e.g., Ethical Journalism: A Handbook of Values and Practices for the News and 
Editorial Departments, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2004), https://www.nytco.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/NYT_Ethical_Journalism_0904-1.pdf (illustrating one exemplary code of 
ethics); Handbook of Journalism: Standards and Values, REUTERS, 
http://handbook.reuters.com/index.php?title=Standards_and_Values (last visited Sept. 7, 2017) 
(listing ten absolutes required of all Reuters reporters); The Washington Post Standards and Ethics, 
AM. SOC’Y OF NEWS EDITORS, http://asne.org/content.asp?contentid=335 (last visited Sept. 7, 
2017) (reflecting another well-written code of ethics). 
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get it out, and survive in an increasingly competitive atmosphere.285 In 
the context of criminal justice, the SPJ’s Code explicitly acknowledges 
the tensions involved in handling criminal records, stating that journalists 
should “[b]alance a suspect’s right to a fair trial with the public’s right to 
know” and “[c]onsider the implications of identifying criminal suspects 
before they face legal charges.”286 
Journalists also understand the implications of both longevity and 
ready accessibility in the context of online news. Editor Kathy English 
calls this the “longtail of the news” in a report she authored under the 
auspices of the Associated Press Media Editors (“APME”) Online 
Journalism Credibility Project.287 Her paper focused on the rapidly 
 
285. See Why Doesn’t SPJ Enforce its Code of Ethics?, SOC’Y OF PROF’L JOURNALISM, 
http://www.spj.org/ethicsfaq.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2017) (explaining “all journalism ethics is a 
balancing act between often conflicting responsibilities” and giving examples of that balancing act: 
“Seek truth and report it . . . [but] [m]inimize harm[; a]ct independently [but b]e accountable”); see 
also Lene Bech Sillesen, Exploring Ethics Through Journalism Hotlines: How News Associations 
Are Keeping Up with Changing Principles, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Sept. 18, 2014), 
http://archives.cjr.org/behind_the_news/ethics_hotlines.php (discussing how “the Online News 
Association is crowdsourcing a project that allows journalists to build individual codes of ethics on 
the premise that one standardized code can no longer represent everyone”); compare CARL 
BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN 79 (Simon & Schuster 1974) 
(describing Washington Post’s Watergate reporting: “Gradually, an unwritten rule was evolving: 
unless two sources confirmed a charge involving activity likely to be considered criminal, the 
specific allegation was not used in the paper.”), with TOM GOLDSTEIN, JOURNALISM AND TRUTH: 
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 16 (Northwestern University Press 2007) (arguing two-source rule and 
hard-and-fast rule of not relying on anonymous sources “would be the loss of a tremendous amount 
of [important and accurate] news” (citing James B. Stewart, Consider the Sources, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 4, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/07/04/reviews/990704.704stewat.html?mcubz=0)). To be sure, 
the media has not always lived up to these aspirations, especially in the highly charged news culture 
of the day. However, the shock of the most recent political campaigns, and the emergence of “alt-
news” and alternative facts may have jolted journalists into self-reflection and a renewed 
commitment to such guiding principles. See, e.g., Kyle Pope, An Open Letter to Trump from the 
US Press Corps, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Jan. 17, 2017), 
http://www.cjr.org/covering_trump/trump_white_house_press_corps.php (describing how the 
Press Corps plans to interact with President Trump during his presidency); Steven Perlberg, Media 
Looks Inward After Donald Trump Surprise, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/media-looks-inward-after-donald-trump-surprise-1478720405 
(discussing the disdain for the media and the media’s struggle to compete with social media 
platforms); Jim Rutenberg & James Poniewozik, Can the Media Recover from This Election?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/arts/television/after-this-election-
can-the-media-recover.html?_r=0 (describing how the 2017 presidential election affected the 
media). 
286. SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 282 (illustrating difficulties that journalists have with 
handling criminal records). 
287. See generally Kathy English, The Longtail of News: To Unpublish or Not to Publish, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS MANAGING EDITORS ONLINE CREDIBILITY PROJECT (2009), 
www.apme.com/resource/resmgr/online_journalism_credibility/long_tail_report.pdf (discussing 
the rationale behind “unpublishing” news). 
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increasing phenomena (invoked by Ms. Martin in her case) of requests to 
“unpublish” articles,288 and editors’ efforts to handle these requests.289 
According to English’s research, reports of criminal records, especially 
reports involving minor crimes, represent “a significant source” of 
requests to unpublish.290 Editors correctly resist such requests as a form 
of coercive, content-based censorship. “[T]oday’s newspaper has always 
been tomorrow’s historical record,” English writes.291 One publisher 
challenged even the word “unpublishing,” arguing that these requests are 
actually “asking to censor or rewrite history.”292 
The SPJ’s Code of Ethics specifically addresses the issue of 
corrections and updates, suggesting that journalists “consider the long-
term implications of the extended reach and permanence of publication,” 
and “[p]rovide updated and more complete information as 
appropriate.”293 The New York Times takes a restrained approach: 
On rare occasions, the Times will add an addendum to crime stories if 
the subject contacts the Times to say he or she was acquitted, or that 
charges were dropped. The Times only does this for stories involving 
major crimes, and it requires the person involved to supply copies of 
related legal documents as proof.294 
The Times recognizes that publishing corrections represents a more 
reasonable alternative than “unpublishing,” but explains that its more 
constrained approach is “just a question of resources. . . . [W]e could 
spend all of our reporters’ time doing follow-ups to 15-year-old stories. 
It’s not what we’re in the business of doing.”295 
Other editors have responded, recognizing that even an addendum 
might not be enough, instead favoring the publication of follow-up 
stories.296As one editor explained, the correction or addendum needs to 
be as prominent as the original story.297 “Publishing a follow-up that puts 
the correct information on the record and links to the previous article is 
 
288. Unpublish is “a word media organizations have coined to describe public requests to 
remove content from news Websites.” Id. at 1. 
289. See id. at 1, 3–5 (demonstrating some exemplary ways editors created policies to handle 
requests for unpublishing). 
290. See id. at 5 (illustrating the growth of such requests over recent years). 
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292. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
293. SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 282 (stressing the need to deliberate on ramifications of 
corrections). 
294. Mallory Jean Tenore, 5 Ways News Organizations Respond to ‘Unpublishing’ Requests, 
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unpublishing-requests/104414/. 
295. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
296. Id. 
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also a means of ensuring ongoing accuracy[.]”298 
While not going so far as to support unpublishing on demand, at least 
one news outlet, GateHouse Communications, reports that it has 
programmed the websites of some of its online outlets to have police 
blotter reports “fall off” the websites after six months.299 Such a practice, 
a voluntary and automatic purging of certain types of sensitive records, 
offers one solution. But if this practice were applied broadly, as would be 
necessary to really solve the problems raised here, it would eliminate—
or at least gut—what many recognize as a valuable resource for historical 
research: comprehensive media archives.300 
Against this background, I propose a modest solution that focuses 
exclusively on online publications. I propose that publishers of online 
media outlets adopt a voluntary policy of correcting reports of criminal 
records that remain available on their websites under certain 
circumstances. Based on the New York Times’ approach, but applied more 
generously, a workable policy might look like this: 
A publisher will publish a brief addendum to its online report of an 
individual’s criminal record, provided the original report is still readily 
accessible to the public on the publisher’s website, and provided the 
individual who is the subject of the online report submits to the publisher 
a court order or other law-enforcement-authenticated document 
indicating that the individual’s record has been expunged pursuant to an 
expungement statute, or that other similar action (such as pardon, 
commutation, or even the entry of a certificate of rehabilitation) has 
occurred. The updated publication or article should indicate that it has 
been amended. 
The policy is drafted to apply to online publications for two reasons: 
First, as noted above, online publications have virtually unlimited shelf-
lives, and even elderly reports are easily accessible. This magnifies the 
harm. Indeed, online publications really represent the heart of the 
problem addressed in this Article. Second, while amending online 
publications is not cost-free, the expense and burdens are significantly 
 
298. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Tenore discusses how journalistic responsibility to 
ensure ongoing accuracy of content published online may require further reporting, especially in 
cases involving charges against individuals named in the news. See id. 
299. English, supra note 287, at 5. GateHouse Media “publish[es] 125 daily newspapers, more 
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the building blocks of history by erasing entire swaths of information, especially without a view to 
specific content. 
300. See supra notes 260–262 and accompanying text. 
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less than those for print publications, provided the information the 
publisher is being asked to report is brief and can be easily verified. 
Relying on official documentation will relieve news outlets of the 
burden of independently verifying the information provided.301 
Requiring that the request come from the subject of the report will ensure 
that only the individual involved can refresh the story, as publishing an 
addendum necessarily will do. Further, locating the authority to request 
an addendum with the individual respects the individual’s autonomy 
regarding whether to seek to amend the report or to let it stand.302 
Requiring acknowledgement in the publication that the article has been 
amended advances the interest of media transparency.303 
Finally, I propose publishing only an addendum, and not a fully 
developed follow-up story. Developing and reporting a follow-up story 
would involve significant time and resources.304 Further, while a 
separate, fully developed article might at first blush appear more effective 
than an addendum, it actually might not be. A correction in the context of 
an online publication will likely appear adjacent or linked to the original 
report, and will be brief, easy to find, and easy to read, making it quite 
likely that the reader will find and read it. A full-blown story might be 
harder to place near the original story and, because of its length, might 
not be read, undermining the effectiveness of the remedy. 
As noted, as publishers recognize that online content has a long life 
and is easy to access; they appear willing to entertain realistic policies to 
address this issue fairly and are wrestling with their options.305 Thus, 
publishers might be receptive to such a narrowly crafted policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Many have argued powerfully that, as a culture, we should be more 
willing to forgive an individual’s criminal past, especially if that 
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individual has rehabilitated his or her life.306 Bernard Kogon and Donald 
Loughery argue that expungement, which they refer to as “the big lie,” 
does more harm than good, and that the better approach is to leave the 
record alone and work on changing societal attitudes about offenders.307 
True believers in the power of a free and robust media to inform society 
(and I count myself among those true believers) would argue that shining 
a light on the vast numbers of ordinary people with criminal records will 
do much to de-stigmatize individuals with criminal records, blunting the 
impact and minimizing the collateral consequences. Unfortunately, such 
an overly optimistic vision borders on willful naivety, and sacrifices those 
with records as cannon fodder to what would be a futile experiment. 
More promising, perhaps, would be broad-based adoption of Judge 
Gleeson’s approach to certificates of rehabilitation. As he noted, a formal 
proceeding in which the judge reviews the record in detail and makes 
findings about an individual’s rehabilitation might provide persuasive 
evidence for an employer, landlord, or lender.308 In crafting the certificate 
of rehabilitation in the Doe case, Judge Gleeson explained: 
[T]he judicial certificate I am awarding Doe will convey to others that 
the same court that held Doe accountable for her criminal acts has now 
concluded after careful scrutiny that she is rehabilitated. In other words, 
the Court is recommending that she be welcomed to participate in 
society in the ways the rest of us do.309 
Initial research indicates that such instruments can have a positive 
effect on lessening the impact of at least some collateral consequences of 
a criminal record.310 Such formal acknowledgement of rehabilitation also 
works hand in hand with the media policy proposed above. 
A number of states provide for certificates of rehabilitation, although 
 
306. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 442 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting that the 
forgiveness model is gaining favor in the reentry community for philosophical and practical 
reasons); Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at the 
State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 378 (2016) (describing recent movement 
in favor of expanding forgiveness remedies); see generally Bernard Kogon & Donald. L. Loughery, 
Jr., Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records—The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & 
POLICE SCI. 378 (1970) (arguing that until community bias against offenders is “uprooted, real 
correctional rehabilitation will remain effectively crippled”). 
307. Kogon, supra note 306, at 388. 
308. See Doe, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 442–45 (describing how prospective employers do not have 
time to get a full understanding without the certificate); see also Love, supra note 16, at 792 
(discussing the value of judicial certification of a person’s rehabilitation as compared to an 
administrative board). 
309. Doe, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 445. 
310. See Leasure, supra note 3, at 13 (suggesting from an empirical study that certificates of 
relief may be an effective avenue for reducing the stigma of a criminal record for ex-offenders 
seeking employment). 
 
56 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  49 
the federal system has no formal process for this.311 While this remedy 
might seem promising, its effectiveness relies on society’s willingness to 
be persuaded by the recitation of rehabilitation. Further, the sheer volume 
of individuals who might seek certificates might simply overwhelm an 
already taxed system.312 Finally, the vast majority of individuals with 
criminal records are indigent and do not have the funds to hire counsel to 
navigate the expungement process.313 
Which of course, brings us back to the problem of over-criminalization 
and its devastating consequences that, once unleashed, defy efforts to 
constrain its havoc. Only genuine criminal justice reform can address the 
essence of the problem. In the absence of that, this modest proposal of 
voluntary correction offers little more than a make-shift effort to 
minimize the damage in the shadow of a much larger crisis—a crisis 
society ignores at its peril. 
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